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THESIS

COMPARISON OF THE U.S. AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

by

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**COMPARISON OF THE U.S. AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the issue of civil-military relations has become critical to the development of the new Eastern European democracies. Both the United States and Germany have a long civil-military relations tradition. A comparison of the United States' and Germany's approaches to civil-military relations will provide clear examples for new democratic states to follow, as they develop their civil-military relations, especially as they consider multi-national NATO units.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study compares the basic principles of civil-military relations¹ necessary in a theoretical democratic state with the specific American approach and the German concept of civil-military relations. It will explain which elements of the American approach and the German concept form good foundations for civil-military relations in new democratic states, especially when considering an enlarged NATO or multinational units.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the issue of civil-military relations has become critical to the development of the new eastern European democracies. Both the United States and Germany have long civil-military relations traditions and although all developments have not been successful, the last fifty years have seen substantial achievements that can provide these new democratic countries with needed direction. A comparison of United States and German civil-military relations successes may provide the new democracies with an opportunity to select from the best of both countries.

The understanding of the civil-military relations concept requires a theoretical foundation. However, theory cannot explain all facts at all times and requires abstraction, and abstraction requires the simplification and ordering of reality. Therefore this paper follows Huntington's methodological assumption, that civil-military relations are composed of a system of interdependent elements.

The principal components of such a system are the formal, structural position of military institutions in the government, the informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society at large, and the nature of the ideologies of military and nonmilitary groups.²

¹ Paul Bracken explains civil-military relations as the relationship of the military to the state and society, Bracken, Paul, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Miranda A., (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition, Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 145.

² Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p. viii.

According to the currently prevailing theory of civil-military relations, a few basic principles must be achieved to meet the requirements of a democratic constitutional state. Therefore, in Chapter II, a description of these fundamental civil-military relations principles is provided, beginning with Samuel P. Huntington's civil-military relations theory in his book *The Soldier and the State*, proceeding with Morris Janowitz's ideas in *The Professional Soldier*,³ and concluding with the newer theories about civil-military relations. The main principles are: a) democratic civilian control of the military, based on the constitution and the rule of law, b) civil-military cooperation over security issues during the decision making-process and civilian supremacy in the final decisions, and c) integration of the military and its soldiers into state and society, including democratic rights for soldiers.

The third Chapter describes the development of civil-military relations in the United States since 1787, with the exception of the Civil War and its special civil-military relations, because this is a separate episode in the American history. Chapter III begins with a description of the intention of the American Constitution to divide the power and control the military and the American liberalism, to refuse a standing army and navy, which leads to a militia system, and the subsequent development of the military profession in the United States after the Civil War. Tensions in the civil-military relations should have been balanced with the Neo-Hamiltonian compromise (1890-1930), but the long tradition of societal opposition to military ideas lasting until 1941, didn't allow a harmonized relationship between civilian society and the military. The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the declaration of war by the Axis powers threatened the geographically isolated nation and changed the patterns of American civil-military relations. During World War II, the military became a mass armed force with a conscript system. The result of the Second World War imposed duties on the United States as a global superpower with worldwide military commitments, which required a new concept of civilian control over the military. The Cold War kept the United States in a constant level of high alert, which had consequences

³ Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier, New York: The Free Press Paperback Edition, 1964.

for the whole society and its economic capabilities. The Korean and Vietnam Wars demanded a high sacrifice from the American nation and enforced all-volunteer armed forces with its consequences for civil-military relations. The end of the Cold War in 1990 strengthened the global position of the United States but imposed new obligations for peace, freedom and liberty in the world. The so-called 'post modern military' is operating in a new environment with challenging tasks. A constant changing civil-military relationship requires adjustments from the military.

The fourth Chapter describes the development of civil-military relations in Prussia from 1640 to 1871; in the German Reich until 1933; the Third Reich until 1945; and the Federal Republic of Germany beginning in 1949. Only 4 years after the unconditional surrender of the *Wehrmacht*, the circumstances of the Cold War convinced Britain, France and the United States to support the establishment of armed forces in West Germany. Political problems related to Germany's military experience, like militarization of the society through the Prussian army, the 'state within the state' of the *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht*, with its total obedience, were heavy in the minds of the founders of the *Bundeswehr* in the 1950s. Therefore, the aim was an integration of the new Armed Forces in the new democratic state of the Federal Republic of Germany and its society, and in the structure of the Western Alliance. The West German concept of civil-military relations became known as *Innere Fuehrung*, and its model of the *citizen in uniform* was developed. Since this time, a more secure environment has led to changes in society and these developments have had implications for the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*. Recent events, such as German unification in 1990, the "out-of-area"⁴ missions, peacekeeping, and the establishment of multinational units are also considered.

In the fifth Chapter, the study compares the theoretical principles of civil-military relations in a democratic state with the American approach and the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and considers the question of whether the American and German concepts meet the democratic requirements. The aim is

⁴ "Out-of-area" means beyond the territory of the NATO Allies. Article 6 of the Washington Treaty defines the geographical scope of Article 5.

to explore which elements of both concepts could be used as a foundation of civil-military relations in democratic constitutional states, especially in the new democratic states in central and eastern Europe and, moreover, in the NATO member states as a precondition for development and maintenance of multinational NATO units.

In Chapter VI, the challenges for the 'postmodern military' in a changing environment will be described and an assessment about the flexibility of the American and German approach in adjusting their militaries to changing civil-military relations will be done.

Finally, in Chapter VII, conclusions will be drawn between the differences and similarities of the American and German approach to civil-military relations.

II. PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORIES AND MILITARY PROFESSION

A. PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY

A description of civil-military relations principles and a comparison of the evolution of democratic civil-military relations in Central Europe must begin with the character of the absolutist state and the fate of its institutions in the 18th, 19th, and 20th century. In addition, the role of the Prussian army as well as state and society from the point of departure is necessary for any understanding of the subjects at hand. The Prussian reformers of the early 19th century proceeded from this original civil-military reform of the late- 17th and early 18th centuries, and all subsequent arrangements of soldiers and politics in Prussia, Austria and Germany likewise emerged from this single source. The rise of the strong state and the standing army upon nobility, aristocracy, court and bureaucracy relied represents the first chapter of the soldier and the state in Prussia/Germany.⁵

Until the emergence of modern states, the absolutist ruler embodied the supreme direction of all government functions in his own person. He had no struggle with the balance between political and military branches in government and civilian control over the military.

The emergence of modern nation states with the dual system of government⁶ and the coming up of standing armies in peacetime has developed differently in each country.⁷ Such developments occurred in Great Britain in 1689, in the United States in 1776 and in Germany in 1813, and have led to the questioning of democratic civil-military relations and its political implications for civilian control over the military as well as to the nature of the participation of the

⁵ Abenheim, Donald, introduction statement for the course: Advanced Special Topic in Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and Politics in the Euro-Atlantic Past: Case Studies of Policy, Personality and Crisis, 1640-1960, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, Winter Quarter, January 2003.

⁶ Dual system of government means the division of power between the crown and the parliament, the representation of the population.

⁷ Schulze, Hagen, States, Nations and Nationalism, From the Middle Ages to the Present, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers inc., 1994, pp. 23-24.

military in the decision making process.⁸ This issue, how to balance the tensions between politicians and militaries, is the centerpiece of the civil-military relations theory.

Carl von Clausewitz⁹ considered armies as political institutions, because, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”¹⁰ In considering the relation between military leaders and politicians, he went on to say that, “war in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.”¹¹ Hew Strachan, Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow, concludes that “strategy is at once both political and military. The political objectives in war have to be moderated by what is militarily feasible: the formulation of a practical plan must be bound by military capabilities.”¹² “Politicians need to be militarily informed, and soldiers -more controversially- need to be politically integrated.”¹³

When discussing the role of military intervention in politics, S. E. Finer wrote (1962) in his book, *The Man on Horseback*, that there are four ascending levels of intervention, “influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantation.”¹⁴ Strachan agrees with the key point of Finer, namely that the political culture is most important for military involvement in politics.

All armies are inherently predisposed to political activity: what curbs their influence is less their own characteristics and more the context in which they are operating. In countries of (what he

⁸ Strachan, Hew, The Politics of the British Army, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 1-2.

⁹ Clausewitz's widow published *On War (Vom Kriege)* in 1832, one year after Carl von Clausewitz's death. Clausewitz was a student of Scharnhorst, the reformer of the Prussian Army in 1808-09, and a colleague of Gneisenau, who took over Scharnhorst's duties as Chief of General Staff. The main body of *On War*, came from an unpublished manuscript on the *Theory of War*, written between 1816 and 1818. *On War (Vom Kriege)* was translated by Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 61.

¹⁰ Howard, p. 87.

¹¹ Howard, p. 87.

¹² Strachan, p. 1.

¹³ Strachan, pp. 2.

¹⁴ Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 7, and Strachan, p. 8.

dubbed) developed political culture, the civilian authorities, by virtue of longevity, popular acceptance, or constitutional legitimacy do not provide the opportunities for armies to exploit their potential for exercising power. On the other hand, if civilian political culture is low, armies naturally spill over to fill the vacuum.¹⁵

This fear of military praetorian activity can be observed from the very beginning of the development of democratic civil-military relations, which in each country had its roots during the creation of the nation. In Great Britain, this began early in the seventeenth century, in the United States, in 1776, and such developments started at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Prussia. However, for each country, it was a long and painful process.

In Great Britain, democratic civil-military relations began with the early constitutional developments of the seventeenth century and with the 1689 settlement of dual political control of the army and navy through the crown and parliament.¹⁶ After experiencing two different systems- first the “army of Plebeians exclusively under the Parliament” and second, the “army of Cavaliers exclusively under the crown,”¹⁷ William III installed the so called “Glorious Revolution,” which was a settlement that provided “constitutional safeguards for the freedom of the people against the possible adverse action in time of peace of a standing army.”¹⁸ The power over the military was divided; the command was a responsibility of the crown, administration of the army was given to civil ministers, who were responsible to the parliament. “Thus the army was subordinated to a form of dual control, where one authority could act as a check over the other,”¹⁹ as an attempt towards civilian control.

In the United States, “the experiences of the Colonial Era and the Revolutionary War confirmed the American conviction that civilian control of the

¹⁵ Strachan, p. 9.

¹⁶ Strachan, p. 11.

¹⁷ The Army of James III.

¹⁸ Strachan, p. 44.

¹⁹ Strachen, p. 44.

military was an indispensable attribute of liberty and therefore of democracy.”²⁰ On July 4th, 1776, the Declaration of Independence was adopted, which “expressed views on the proper relationship between civil and military authority.”²¹ This was explicitly defined in the Constitution in 1787.

In Germany, “King Fredrick William III of Prussia awarded the first Iron Cross in 1813, during the iron time of the wars of liberation against Napoleon.”²² He awarded the decoration for bravery in battle, without making a distinction for the recipient’s rank in society. “The medal signified the democratization of the army and its unity with the nation and the state in the struggle against the French occupier.”²³ In Germany, the civilian control over the military started more slowly and later than in Great Britain or the USA. However, the Prussian Army Reform of 1808 was the first attempt “to open the officer corps to talented members of the middle class and to make educational qualification the decisive fact in securing a commission.”²⁴ In 1848, Prussia became a “constitutional state with the promulgation of the royal charte.”²⁵

1. Huntington’s Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations received great attention in the 1950s with Samuel P. Huntington’s book, *The Soldier and the State*. One of his students, Eliot A. Cohen, described this book as a classic work of political science, in which

²⁰ Trask, David F., Democracy and Defense, Civilian Control of the Military in the United States, United States Information Agency, April 1993, p. 8.

²¹ Trask, p. 8.

²² Abenheim, Donald, Reforging the Iron Cross, The Search for Tradition in the west German Armed forces, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 4.

²³ Abenheim, p. 4.

²⁴ Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 43.

²⁵ Craig, p. 121, at the very out set, the Prussian constitution repudiated all doctrines of popular sovereignty and reaffirmed the principles of divine-right monarchy. Moreover, the Crown was given a right of absolute veto over all legislation, and the army was left outside the constitution, subject only to the king’s control. However, the parliament had one important power, the control over the budget.

Huntington “sets out a theory of civil-military relations, to guide both civilians and soldiers in their relationship.”²⁶

Huntington defines civil-military relations as “the principal institutional component of military security policy.”²⁷ He distinguishes between quantitative, qualitative and dynamic issues:

- The quantitative issue of the size, recruitment, and supply of the military forces, including the fundamental question of the proportion of state resources devoted to military needs;
- The qualitative issue of the organization, composition, equipment, and deployment of the military forces, including the types of armaments and weapons, the locations of bases, arrangements with allies, and similar questions;
- The dynamic issues of the utilization of military forces; when and under what circumstances force is brought into action.

These fundamental issues of civil-military relations are always present, continuously redefined and never resolved. The objective of this institutionalized policy is to “develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.”²⁸ The achievement of this objective involves a complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilians and military groups. “Nations which develop a proper balance pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security.”²⁹ Civil-military relations in any society are shaped by two forces- one is the threat to the society’s security from outside, and the other is the threat arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions from inside the society. Huntington defines the balance between social values and military function as civil-military relations.

Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations. The degree to which they conflict depends upon the

²⁶ Cohen, Elliot A., Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, And Leadership In Wartime, New York: The Free Press, p. 226.

²⁷ Huntington, p. 1.

²⁸ Huntington, p. 2

²⁹ Huntington, p. 2.

intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of society.³⁰

Huntington's main theory of civilian control of the military was developed from a general point of view about tensions between the civil sector and the military and the question of how military power can be minimized. Civilian control means a relative power of civilian over military groups. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington described two basic forms of minimizing military power by civilian control, namely the subjective and the objective forms of civilian control.

Subjective civilian control means maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, with the aim of denying an independent military sphere. The end state of this control is civilianizing the military, and making soldiers the mirror of the state. An important prerequisite is military participation in politics. Therefore, Huntington³¹ suggests that subjective civilian control is only possible in the absence of a professional officer corps.

Objective civilian control posits a distribution of political power between military and civilian groups, with the aim of maximizing military professionalism. The end state of this control is militarizing the military, and making soldiers the tool of the state. As a result, there is no military participation in politics. Huntington points out that the essence is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism and a politically neutral officer corps.³² To support his theory, Huntington quotes a Command and General Staff College publication from 1936:³³

Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. ... The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and

³⁰ Huntington, p. 2.

³¹ Huntington, pp. 80-83. (Huntington defines professional military, as a political neutral body. The officer corps, one without any political activity)

³² Huntington, pp. 83-85.

³³ Note: this statement is in opposition to Clausewitz who wrote that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means, Howard, p. 87

operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing.³⁴

In summary, Huntington preferred the theory of objective control, with strictly divided military and political spheres and a politically neutral professional military, one that is focused on winning wars. In his book *Supreme Command*, Eliot A. Cohen referred to this as the “normal”³⁵ theory of civil-military relations, because this theory explains from his point of view, that this is the most effective form of civilian control over the military, one that maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics,³⁶ and gives them as free a hand as possible in military matters.³⁷

2. Reconsidering the Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Since the 1950s, when Huntington laid down his view about civil-military relations, additional scholars, politicians and the media have all contributed to the theory of civil-military relations, providing a few novel and essential ideas. In 1960, Morris Janowitz diverged from Huntington, however, he directed the civil-military theory in a new direction, away from the strict segregation of the military and the civilian society. Morris Janowitz³⁸ replaced Huntington’s “traditional” military professionalism with his “pragmatic professionalism”. It was his opinion that although the military should not participate directly in politics, it should nevertheless be strongly linked to the political system and the state. Janowitz

³⁴ Huntington, p. 308.

³⁵ Cohen was a student of Huntington. Cohen sees Huntington’s explanations for civil-military relations as consisting of a “normal” civil-military relations theory. From his point of view, Huntington’s classic, *The Soldier and the State*, is “the accepted theoretical standard by which the current reality is to be judged.” Cohen, p. 226. For evidence of the durability of Huntington’s views, he gives in the endnotes a list of exemplary sources, which use Huntington’s theory. Cohen, p. 273.

³⁶ However, Cohen did accept that mixed political-military decisions do indeed occur; in truth, they occur even more frequently than the ‘normal’ theory would suggest, Cohen, p. 242.

³⁷ Cohen, p. 4.

³⁸ Janowitz, 1964.

advocated a military as a “constabulary force,”³⁹ integrated into civilian society, sharing society’s common values,⁴⁰ and “maintaining a broad political perspective.”⁴¹ He prophesized a trend of convergence of military and society, enforced by the bureaucracy and supported by technological developments shared by both spheres.

A difference in opinion was expressed by the British scholar S.E. Finer, who, in 1962, came to the opposite conclusion as Huntington. He felt that “military professionalism could in fact incline militaries to engage in politics⁴² rather than not,”⁴³ because the civil society finds militarism attractive⁴⁴ and the military can effectively resist civilian control.⁴⁵

In 1971, under the influence of the Vietnam War, Charles Moskos in *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*⁴⁶ advocated a more contemporary civil-military relations approach, one which linked the arguments of Huntington and Janowitz. Snider summarized Moskos conclusions:

There are always forces producing both convergence and divergence between the civilian and military components of society. ... There are trends in some areas toward greater integration between the military and civilians in society, but also trends in other areas toward a traditional, isolated military. Moskos therefore

³⁹ Janowitz, p. 418.

⁴⁰ Janowitz, p. 440.

⁴¹ Snider and Carlton-Carew, U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition, Washington D.C.: The Center of Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 4.

⁴² Ritter, Gerhard, *The Sword and the Scepter (Kriegshandwerk und Staatskunst): The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, trans. Heinz Norden, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1969 – 1973, Vol. II, p. 210; Germany’s master concept for the opening stages of the First World War, the Schlieffen Plan, was a tragic and unique case of strategy dragging policy along with it. Politicians had a vague concept of what the plan entailed, but were unable or unwilling to deal with the political implications of violating the Belgium neutrality and starting a war as fast as possible to achieve advantage against France and the consequence that there was no space for diplomacy to negotiate a peace settlement.

⁴³ Finer, p. 207.

⁴⁴ The Army that Huntington praised as having the most professional officer corps, the German Army between 1871 and 1914, repeatedly intervened in politics. Huntington, p. 99.

⁴⁵ Finer, pp. 7-10.

⁴⁶ Moskos, Charles C., Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, “Armed Forces and American Society: Convergence or Divergence,” Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971, pp. 271-292.

avored a plural military, instead of a homogeneous military, somewhere inside the civilian-military spectrum.⁴⁷

Amos Perlmutter, in 1977, published *The Military and Politics in Modern Time*, where he described different political orders; from stable, followed by revolutionary and instable political orders, which shape the character of the soldier. However, in every political order, the soldier himself is in a job which is inherently political. Therefore, the military cannot take a neutral political stance.⁴⁸ Opposite to Huntington, he “links the growth of professionalism to an increasing political awareness.”⁴⁹ Furthermore, Perlmutter went on to explain that, “the military⁵⁰ is in politics to the degree that it is a key partner of civilian politicians and bureaucrats in the formation and implementation of national security policy.”⁵¹

In 1992, in reaction to the end of the Cold War, Sam Sarkesian,⁵² that civil-military relations have three broad, interrelated elements; political leadership, the political-social system, and the military. He supported an enhanced role for the military in national security policy-making while still maintaining political neutrality.⁵³

Paul Bracken suggested that Huntington’s theory has to be reconsidered, because “the very division of the problem into two broad parts -civil and military- created a ‘tension’ that was an artifact of the construct. It suggested a search for

⁴⁷ Snider and Carlton-Carew, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers, New Haven, 1977, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Strachan, p. 18.

⁵⁰ As a part of the bureaucracy professionalism.

⁵¹ Perlmutter, pp. 1-2.

⁵² Sarkesian, Sam C., Civil-Military Relations in a Liberal Society: The United States in a New Security Era, Ohio, Ohio State University Mershon Center Conference on Civil-Military Relations, December 4-6, 1992.

⁵³ Snider and Carlton-Carew, p. 4.

a dividing line to sort problems into two areas, civil or military. This is not what happened.”⁵⁴

Another scholar, Peter Feaver, argued, in the same volume about U.S. Civil-Military Relations, that in contradiction to Huntington’s theory, the traditional “subjective-objective” typology as it relates to the division of labor between the military and civilian society has never really been observed. In his view, a delegative control mechanism is a “pattern of control in which civilians respect military autonomy over operational matters in exchange for voluntary military subordination to civilian authority on other matters.”⁵⁵

Even Huntington’s student, Cohen, in the final assessment of his book *Supreme Command*, came to the conclusion that, “the boundaries between political ends and military means are more uncertain than Huntington suggests, civilian control must take on a form different from that of “objective control”, at least in its original understanding.⁵⁶

A comparison and an evaluation of the different theories suggest that although Huntington’s theory of an independent sphere for the military remains an attractive one to the military, for reasons of effectiveness (especially effective in short conflicts such as the 1991 Gulf War), in reality it is impractical. In general, it is an unrealistic approach to divide the complex world into independent civil and military spheres, since so many military issues have political implications. Therefore, rather than just accepting Huntington’s ideas, subsequent scholars have applied different theoretical approaches to arrive at contradictory conclusions.

⁵⁴ Bracken, Paul, “Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations,” in Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Miranda A., (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition, Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 152

⁵⁵ Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Miranda A., “The Current State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: An Introduction,” in Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Miranda A., (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition, Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 5.

⁵⁶ Cohen, p. 248. Under original understanding, Cohen means Huntington’s definition.

Based on these theories, this study describes civil-military relations, organized under the following three main principles:

1. Democratic civilian control of the military, based on the constitution and the rule of law;
2. Civil-military cooperation over security issues during the decision-making process and civilian supremacy in the final decisions;
3. Integration of the military and its soldiers into state and society, including democratic rights for soldiers.

These three principles are further discussed in Chapter V.

B. PRINCIPLES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

1. Link between Civil-Military Relations and Military Profession

As previously mentioned, civil-military relations are defined as the relationships of the military to the state and society as a whole. The term “military profession” exclusively refers to only the military side of the civil-military relations, the attitude of the military society to the state and the civilian society. Military profession can never be seen as independent because it is acting in the socio, political and economic dependency of the state and society. There is a constant change in the military profession in response to the change of the environment. The nation’s “political culture within which the army is operating”⁵⁷ is a decisive factor for the influence of the military profession.

Janowitz defined profession in general as follows:

A profession is more than a group with special skill, acquired through intensive training. A professional group develops a sense of group identity and a system of internal administration. ... This

⁵⁷ Strachan, p. 19.

implies the growth of a body of ethics and standards of performance.⁵⁸

Therefore, one cannot speak of the emergence of an integrated military profession until after 1800.

2. Three Essential Criteria of the Status of a Profession

Huntington speaks of three essential elements which are necessary to define a profession. "The distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."⁵⁹

Professional expertise can be achieved by education, experience and competence. A person possessing expertise has the professional-knowledge and skills, and is "capable of general application irrespective of time and place."⁶⁰

Responsibility is imposed upon the professional man, an essential part of the general character of his service and the monopoly of his skills to perform the service when required by the society. "This social responsibility distinguishes the professional man from other experts with only intellectual skills."⁶¹ The profession becomes a moral unit with certain values and ideals which guide its members.

Corporateness means that the members of a profession share a collective sense of organic unity and consciousness and a unique social responsibility. "Membership in the professional organization, along with the possession of special expertise and the acceptance of special responsibility, thus becomes a criterion of professional status."⁶²

⁵⁸ Janowitz, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Huntington, p. 8.

⁶⁰ Huntington, p. 8.

⁶¹ Huntington, p. 9.

⁶² Huntington, p. 10.

3. The Vocation of Military Officer-ship as a Profession

After defining the criteria of the professional status, the question is, does the vocation of officer-ship meet the principal criteria of a profession?⁶³

First, the expertise of officer-ship is based on a variety of specialists, like engineers, pilots, doctors, as well as ordnance and intelligence experts. These specialists exhibit great differences in their functions, for example from that of a captain of an aircraft carrier to that of a commander of an infantry battalion. Harold Lasswell explains that there is one common central skill of all officers, “the management of violence.”⁶⁴ To achieve successful armed combat capabilities, the officer has to organize, equip and train his forces, make a plan of the activities in combat and give orders for the operation. “The larger and more complex the organizations of violence which an officer is capable of directing, and the greater the number of situations and conditions under which he can be employed, the higher is his professional competence.”⁶⁵ To achieve this high level of expertise, he needs a lot of study, training and experience, probably a higher ratio of educational time than in any other profession. In addition to military skills, an officer requires a broad background of general culture. “The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations and behavior which a liberal education stimulates.”⁶⁶

Second, the responsibility of officer-ship on practice is the management of violence linked to the purpose of the military’s own security and regulated only by the state monopoly. The only client is the society and the officer corps is responsible for military security. Huntington explained:

⁶³ Huntington, p. 11.

⁶⁴ Lasswell, Harold D., *The Garrison State*, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 46, Issue 4 (Jan., 41), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941, p. 455-468, and Huntington, p. 11. Just the firing of a rifle is basically a mechanical craft, however, directing different soldiers shooting and making decisions about priorities and threat assessment needs a lot of education, practice and experience, Huntington, p. 13 and Cohen, p. 226, “Management of violence is the arts of planning, organizing, and employing military forces, but not applying it.”

⁶⁵ Huntington, p. 12.

⁶⁶ Huntington, p. 14

The motivations for the officer are a technical love for his craft and a sense of social obligation to utilize thus craft for the benefit of society. ... Society, on the other hand, can only assure this motivation if it offers its officers continuing and sufficient pay both while on active duty and when retired. ...The behavior within the military structure is governed by a complex mass of regulations, customs, and traditions. His behavior in relation to society is guided by the awareness that his skills can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.⁶⁷

Third, the corporate character of officer-ship is limited to members who, after education and training, receive the commission from the state as well as a number of nonprofessional reservists. "The reservist only temporarily assumes professional responsibility. His principal functions in society lie elsewhere. As a result, his motivation, values, and behavior frequently differ greatly from those of the career professional."⁶⁸ The world of the professional officer "tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of his activities. He normally lives and works apart from the rest of the society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men. The line between him and the civilian is publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank."⁶⁹

3. The Dilemmas of Military Profession

The military profession is facing three main dilemmas. They are the conduct of authority over individuals, the compatibility of skills from the military to the civilian sector, and the relationship of the military to the civilian society.

The military's first unresolved dilemma is its conduct of authority over individuals. The following questions arise:⁷⁰ What is the legitimate scope of military authority over the personal behavior of its members? Is this justified as

⁶⁷ Huntington, p. 15.

⁶⁸ Huntington, p. 17.

⁶⁹ Huntington, p. 16.

⁷⁰ Janowitz, p. xviii.

an effective training, sufficient to prepare men to accept military discipline and to face combat?⁷¹ In this context, another question is how is the morale in the military maintained in combat during a limited war, which produces widespread opposition in the society and indifference in political opinion?⁷²

A second dilemma is the compatibility in skills transferred from the military to the civilian sector. How many skills learned for the military job sector could a member of the armed forces use after the transition to the civilian world? Transferable skills could be achieved by “advanced schooling, not for military purpose alone, but to acquire civilian skills, which they expect to be important to them in retirement.”⁷³ This trend is limited by outsourcing of tasks to civilian companies.

The third dilemma is the relationship of the military to civilian society, a dilemma that starts with the recruitment, especially the officer recruitment. For example, the Prussian army opened its “officer corps in 1808 for talented members of the middle class and to make educational qualification the decisive fact in securing a commission.”⁷⁴ An opposite trend must be considered in the armed forces of the United States, which “lost their direct linkage with sons of the upper class.”⁷⁵ Since the 1960s, new trends in social recruitments have developed. Military profession has continued to be an avenue of social mobility for the sons of lower middle classes, such as skilled workers. In addition, self-recruitment from career military families has increased sharply to more than one third of the entering cadets in the 1960s. This implies a “potential for increased

⁷¹ These questions arise as a result of the level of control of personal behavior, harsh treatment in basic training, and interference in personal autonomy and personal dignity in the U.S. Armed Forces.

⁷² This question is reflected in the Vietnam syndrome, in which soldiers still had to fight during a time when media highlighted dramatic antiwar incidents like mass public demonstrations which occurred at home against the war and the policy of the government. The question was how to challenge the deteriorating moral of the troops in the field?

⁷³ Janowitz, p. xxii.

⁷⁴ Craig, p. 43.

⁷⁵ Janowitz, p. xxv.

social isolation and differentiation from the full structure of United States society.”⁷⁶

Janowitz, in the 1960s, suggested that the relationship of the military officer and his family to the civil society is “hardly so much a pattern of integration as it is of ‘ordered segmentation’.”⁷⁷ “To adjust to the disruption of rotation and indifference of neighbors, the military family lives mainly in their own world.”⁷⁸

The fully volunteer armed forces of the United States since the mid 1970s can be compared to the fully professional force of the German *Reichswehr* between 1919 and 1933, which consisted of highly military professionals, but who were socially more isolated from civilian society than members of a conscript or draft armed forces.

4. Description of Military Profession

“Professionalization is a concept which implies an element of desirable behavior. As it applies to the military, it presents an ambiguous topic, for what is the important of ethics and responsibility for the professional combatant?”⁷⁹

“The art of fighting is an old accomplishment of mankind. The military profession, however, is a recent creation of modern society. ... The profession of officer-ship, however, was essentially a product of the nineteenth century.”⁸⁰ This was in accordance with other professional classes, as civil servants, professors, teachers, clergy, authors, booksellers and publishers, doctors and lawyers. They did hold office or a practice by reason of their expertise, and competence following some kind of education and academic training.⁸¹ Craig describes the instructions of the examining military commission for officers in Germany in 1808, which required knowledge and scholarship as others professions, but in addition

⁷⁶ Janowitz, p. xxviii.

⁷⁷ Janowitz, p. xxxii.

⁷⁸ Janowitz, p. xxxii.

⁷⁹ Janowitz, p. 6.

⁸⁰ Huntington, p. 19.

⁸¹ Schulze, p. 132.

“presence of mind, ready perception, precision, correctness in his duty and propriety in his deportment.”⁸² “Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages.”⁸³ The emergence of standing armies in combination with military profession created the modern tensions⁸⁴ of civil-military relations in North America and Europe.

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington’s assumption is that “the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state.”⁸⁵ Here the conflict of the active directing military element and the active directing element of society comes to a head. Consequently it is necessary to define the nature of the officer corps. Huntington’s most fundamental thesis is, “the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man.”⁸⁶ Cohen, a student of Huntington, in the final conclusions of his book *Supreme Command* writes that the officer’s honor is of paramount importance, despite the allure of a materialistic culture, to distinguish those in the military profession.⁸⁷ In conclusion, for a modern professional appearance it is still necessary that the military man incorporate “the potentials both of combat and of arms control and peace keeping.”⁸⁸ The fighter spirit as well as the capability of a political-military adviser is necessary for officers who aspire to high command. Even in low intensity conflicts and peace-keeping operations the “willingness to face danger, risk, and casualties is an inherent aspect” of military profession.⁸⁹ Casualties are an expected outcome of military operations, the element of inherent risk and continuous uncertainty reflects the difference between the military profession and the civilian sphere.⁹⁰

⁸² Craig, p. 44.

⁸³ Huntington, p. 7.

⁸⁴ The tension is between the military expert and the politician, Huntington, p. 20.

⁸⁵ Huntington, p. 3.

⁸⁶ Huntington, p. 7.

⁸⁷ Cohen, p. 247.

⁸⁸ Janowitz, p. xiii.

⁸⁹ Janowitz, p. xiv.

⁹⁰ Janowitz, p. xii, even the casualties of airline employees which can be statistically estimated, are accepted only as accidents.

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III. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. HISTORIC DEVELOPEMENT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

1. The Constitution of the United States 1787

The history of the United States at the end of the eighteenth and during the nineteenth century is a struggle between the liberal ideology⁹¹ and the conservative⁹² constitution.

In 1787, the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to draft a constitution for the newly independent United States.⁹³ “The experience of the colonial era and the Revolutionary War confirmed the American conviction that civilian control of the military was an indispensable attribute of liberty and therefore of democracy.”⁹⁴ It also reaffirmed the American belief that a militia system was an effective means of dealing with threats to security, whether from within or from foreign countries. Therefore, those assembled sought to strengthen the central government with the power necessary to ensure national security without compromising the liberties for which the nation had fought during the Revolutionary War.⁹⁵

The U.S. Constitution establishes the basic principle that the armed forces are under dual control, by giving the legislative power to the congress, with the right of declaring war and to decide about the national budget,⁹⁶ while the

⁹¹ The democratic liberals are represented by the U.S. Presidents from 1800 until 1824, called the Virginia-dynasty; Jefferson, Madison, Monroe.

⁹² The conservatives are represented during the Federalist Period with Washington, John Adams, Hamilton and Madison.

⁹³ Declaration of Independence in 1776.

⁹⁴ Trask, p. 8.

⁹⁵ Trask, p. 9.

⁹⁶ Constitution, Article I, Section 8, “The Congress shall have power to ... provide for the common defense ... of the United States.” A list of specific powers follows, “to declare War, ... to raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years,” and “to make rules for the government and regulations of the land and naval

president with the executive power is given the position of Commander in Chief.⁹⁷ Moreover, the Constitution provides the basic institutional framework for military organization, divides civilian responsibility for military affairs, and fosters the direct access of the military authorities to the highest level of government:⁹⁸

- Within the total federal system of government, the militia clauses divide control over the militia between the state and national governments.
- Within the national government, the separation of powers divides control⁹⁹ of the national military forces between Congress and the President.¹⁰⁰
- Within the executive branch of the national government, the Commander in Chief clause tends to divide control over the military between the President and the departmental secretaries.¹⁰¹

However, military profession and civilian control didn't yet exist. Rather, "the speeches and writings of the Framers of the Constitution abound with statements that the military should be subordinated to the civil power."¹⁰² Notably however, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution¹⁰³ requires the separation of power and makes therefore legislative office incompatible with judicial or executive, including military office.

In summary, objective civilian control exists in the United States as a product of geographical isolation of the Army from the society, virtual elimination of standing military forces and the exclusion of the military from political power. "It

forces." Kohn, Richard H., The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States 1789-1989, New York: University Press, 1991, p. 22.

⁹⁷ Constitution, Article II, Section 2, "The President shall be the CINC of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." Kohn, 1991, p. 25.

⁹⁸ Huntington, p. 164.

⁹⁹ This prevents the executive branch from making war without the consent of the legislature.

¹⁰⁰ The Congress as the legislative branch, and the President as head of the executive.

¹⁰¹ The allocation of power among the different branches of the government are checks and balances that protected each against the others.

¹⁰² Huntington, pp. 164-185, their approach to civilian control was reflected in their ideas on military officer-ship, military forces and governmental organization.

¹⁰³ Kohn, 1991, p. 21, "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."

became a part of the political tradition in the U.S., but is not a direct consequence of the Constitution.”¹⁰⁴

As a result of the colonists’ opposition against a big standing army at the end of the eighteenth century, the Constitution defined, that the U.S. Armed Forces be based on two pillars: a small standing army¹⁰⁵ and navy¹⁰⁶ and a citizen militia.¹⁰⁷ Today, this can be recognized as the active Armed Forces with an Army, Air force, Navy, and Marine Corps on the one side and on the other side the National Guard Forces. The main focus in this thesis is on the active Armed Forces.

2. Military Profession and American Liberalism 1787 - 1865

The civil-military relations were a continuous struggle between the ‘Liberal American Society’ versus ‘Military Profession’.

From the beginning of the Republic, liberal ideology on one side and the conservative constitution on the other side, built the framework for the American civil-military relations, between political power and military professionalism. “Together, they made objective civilian control depend upon virtually total exclusion of the military from political power.”¹⁰⁸

In 1787, the Constitutional Convention agreed that standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments,

¹⁰⁴ Huntington, pp. 189-190.

¹⁰⁵ The standing army with the upper-class officer and lower-class enlisted men was basically an aristocratic institution, which was seen in America as quite unnecessary. Huntington, p. 166.

¹⁰⁶ Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War, A history of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, p. 45, the Jefferson administration, which entered office in 1801, recommended to build small gunboats to protect their harbors. In peace time, the majority was laid up on shore, to save money. In war time, they would be manned largely by citizen seaman of a naval militia.

¹⁰⁷ The citizen militia states that along with democratic principles the defense of the nation is the responsibility of every citizen, (citizen-soldier). Huntington, p. 167.

¹⁰⁸ Huntington, p. 143.

dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism.¹⁰⁹

Continuing widespread popular concerns about threats to civil liberties led in 1791 to the adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights. This charter of liberty includes the re-emphasized role of the citizen soldier.¹¹⁰ The second clarification about the militia was the Congress Militia Act in 1792, “which provided statutory guidance for the state militias. Each state was required to enroll all able-bodied white males between the ages of 18 and 45 in the militia and to equip and train them.”¹¹¹

Liberalism dominated the American political mind with little change until about 1917.¹¹² The liberal ideas were inherited from the English tradition. The geographical isolation of the United States from the European political struggle until 1917 ensured the absence of external threats and gave the American society political security, which reinforced the dominance of liberalism and kept military institutions small.

The War against Great Britain in 1812-1814, in which the militia system prevailed, demonstrated that the greatest military need of the United States was an education in the principles of strategy for the officer corps.¹¹³

Liberalism in general tried to assert the rights of the individual above the state¹¹⁴ and to reduce defense and foreign policy to domestic issues with neutrality in foreign affairs for as long as possible. The pacifist attitude in the middle class was strong. However, when the decision for war was made, it was

¹⁰⁹ Trask, p. 20.

¹¹⁰ Second Amendment to the Constitution, “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the rights of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”

¹¹¹ Trask, p. 12.

¹¹² Two groups in American history challenged the liberalism, the Federalists (Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, John Marshall and George Washington) from 1789 until 1800 (Jefferson became President) and the Southern conservatism before the civil war 1864.

¹¹³ Weigley, p. 55.

¹¹⁴ As much freedom as possible for the individual, with laws only when necessary. However, Freedom without regulation is anarchy.

like a crusade and “justified as an ideological movement¹¹⁵ in support of the liberal goals.”¹¹⁶ The American liberal approach to the military profession was united, hostile, static and dominant.¹¹⁷ “The pacifist sees the military man contaminating his peace; the crusader sees him contaminating his crusade.”¹¹⁸ The result was a very small standing army and if war broke out, the citizen soldiers were called to arms.¹¹⁹ The liberal Virginia dynasty members, especially President Jefferson, had a general preference for a militia system with citizen warriors over professional ones, for economic reasons. Jefferson and his successor, the Madison administration, had a military police with a strategy of passive defense¹²⁰ which was based on the geographical advantage of separation from the European continental wars against Napoleon.¹²¹ “Without any recognized function in a liberal society and standing outside the American ideological consensus, the military has been a universal target group.”¹²² The military was seen as an isolated economic parasite, as the foundation of aristocracy, and an ally of monarchy and therefore a threat to prosperity of the society, liberty and democracy, with no significant ties to the American society. “The essence of this policy is sustained opposition to military values and military requirements.”¹²³ “When it was necessary to maintain armed forces, American liberalism insisted upon a rigorous subjective civilian control,”¹²⁴ so that military

¹¹⁵ By the assertion of the superiority of American ideals (democracy, freedom of the individual, self-determination, freedom of trade) over other ideals.

¹¹⁶ Huntington, p. 151.

¹¹⁷ Huntington, p. 147 and 153.

¹¹⁸ Huntington, p. 153.

¹¹⁹ In 1847, the Mexican Revolutionary War was a war of American citizen soldiers against the regular Mexican army. America’s annexation of Texas created the new United States-Mexico frontier at the Rio Grande. This added the territory in the west to the United States and opened America’s way westward to the Golden Gate. On the west coast, the combined efforts of the American settlers and the American’s Navy eastern Pacific squadron captured California from Mexico. Weigley, pp. 71-76.

¹²⁰ Weigley, pp. 45-46.

¹²¹ Weigley, p. 48.

¹²² Huntington, p. 154.

¹²³ Huntington, p. 155.

¹²⁴ Huntington, p. 155.

institutions were subordinated and integrated into civilian society and lost their military characteristics. Therefore, the concept was developed, that primary military reliance was placed upon the militia, because military defense is the responsibility of every citizen. It should not be delegated to a small exclusive group. This concept of the “citizen-soldier”¹²⁵ and the “nations in arms” was dominant until the further development of the military professionalism.¹²⁶

Janowitz pointed out that “despite a tradition of hostility against the military establishment, the electorate has demonstrated its willingness to make individual exceptions by repeatedly selecting generals as civilian presidents.”¹²⁷

3. The Creation of the American Military Profession 1865 – 1890

After 1865, when the big Civil War armies and new iron fleets faded away, the United States returned to the ancient scheme of coastal fortifications to protect against foreign invasion and patrolling the Indian frontier with the Army.¹²⁸

U.S. civil-military relations after the Civil War were characterized by the isolation of the Army and Navy. Faced with so-called business pacifism,¹²⁹ the American society was hostile against all military issues and “isolated the armed forces politically, intellectually, socially, and even physically from the community

¹²⁵ The idea was, “that in a free state the citizen did not cease to be a citizen when he became a soldier but rather became a soldier because he was a citizen. Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Oxford, 3rd ed., 4 vols., 1768, pp. I, 407, 413-414.

¹²⁶ Huntington, pp. 156-157.

¹²⁷ Janowitz, p. 3. Fifteen military men were nominated to compete for the highest office in the land and eleven were able to achieve the highest office, the President, Trask, p. 10. Huntington gives as explanation, that “the successful military hero has been the man either who was a nonprofessional soldier or who, if he was a professional soldier, abandoned his military trappings and adopted the guise of liberalism.” Huntington, p. 158. However, in 1952, the election of General Eisenhower signaled a drastically changed condition, because with him a truly professional soldier entered the political stage as soldier-statesmen and became President of the United States.

¹²⁸ Weigley, p. 167.

¹²⁹ For business pacifists, the military was destructive, a consumer of goods and living from other men’s labor. War was a thing of the past, made obsolete as a result of industrialism and it disturbed the growing prosperity. “War was ethically wrong, economically ruinous, and incompatible with modern civilization. ... Eventually, international courts would replace wars just as municipal courts replaced duels.” Huntington, pp. 225-226.

which they served.”¹³⁰ This reflected the continuous beliefs that the nation, thanks to the protection afforded by the great oceans, could avoid involvements in Euro-Asian warfare.¹³¹ Nevertheless, after 1890 more units were required for overseas commitments in Cuba, Hawaii, the Panama-Canal-Zone, and the Philippines. These missions divorced the military from a nation which was rapidly becoming urbanized. Before World War I, in the words of one officer, “soldiers lived apart in their tiny secluded garrisons much after the manner of military monks and they rarely came into contact with the mass of our citizens.”¹³² The average strength of the army between 1871 and 1890 was 25,000 soldiers which were very poorly equipped. The Navy, for example, was by 1880 an “ill-sorted collection of obsolete vessels incapable of functioning together as a fleet.”¹³³

The isolation and reduction of the armed forces after the Civil War led to the low point of American military history, but on the other hand permitted the officer corps “to develop a distinctive military character, the American military profession, its institutions and its ideals. ... The isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization, and peace was a prerequisite to isolation.”¹³⁴ The years of isolation created a professional soldier with military values, discipline and outlooks different to the society. This marked the beginning of the “tension between the conservative professional soldier and the liberal society.”¹³⁵

The characteristics of this professional Armed Forces, formed by General Sherman and Upton for the Army, by Admiral Luce and Mahan for the Navy, and

¹³⁰ Huntington, p. 227.

¹³¹ Trask, p. 19.

¹³² Huntington, pp. 227-228.

¹³³ Huntington, p. 228, only a few years later the cruisers from the White Squadron reflected the first American military naval revival, with new overseas ambitions, Weigley, p. 170.

¹³⁴ Huntington, p. 229.

¹³⁵ Huntington, p. 230.

others¹³⁶ were that it was organized and governed on true military principles with no democratic procedures, divorced from politics, established advanced military schools and maintained the honor and dignity of the nation.¹³⁷ The American reformers, especially General Upton, who toured the world in 1876, were inspired by the German system of military organization and the educational system within military academies. They discovered the backwardness of the American military in comparison to the German. “The desire to imitate German institutions¹³⁸ was an important force in furthering American military professionalism.”¹³⁹ General Upton’s writings, on the other hand, were persuasive enough “that he helped instill a distrust of democracy and the American principle of civilian control of the military in a generation of professional soldiers.”¹⁴⁰

In summary, “professionalism was the reaction of an inherently conservative group against a liberal society.”¹⁴¹ “The arrogance, individualism, and commercialism of American society gave the military the outlook of an estranged minority. ... The sense of alienation was complete and disturbing.”¹⁴² This phenomenon was not limited to the United States alone. It was also seen in similar developments in Great Britain and Germany in connection with the industrial revolution and political mass movements of the liberals and socialists at the middle and end of the nineteenth century.¹⁴³

¹³⁶ The process of military professionalism begun with General Sherman and Upton, and Rear Admiral Luce in 1868, Weigley, pp. 168 – 173. A second generation of reformers carried the professionalism at the turn of the century. Their major figures were Bliss, Wagner, Young and Carter in the Army and Mahan, Taylor, Fiske, Sims in the Navy, Weigley, pp. 173 – 182. “Just as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz, and Moltke set the tone and direction of the German military tradition, these two generations of reformers determined the nature of the professional strand of American militarism.” Huntington, p. 233.

¹³⁷ Huntington, p. 231.

¹³⁸ Like the German General Staff, Huntington, pp. 251-254. The Army received a General Staff in 1903 and the Navy gained its Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915, Trask, p. 19.

¹³⁹ Huntington, p. 235.

¹⁴⁰ Weigley, p. 168.

¹⁴¹ Huntington, p. 233.

¹⁴² Huntington, p. 268.

¹⁴³ Schulze, p. 246, “The Army regarded itself as the sole guardian of the state and the monarchy – not just against foreign aggression, but also against the enemy within, the Social Democrats, Catholics and Liberals”

4. The Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise 1890 - 1930

Only ten years after the low point of American military history in 1880, the cruisers of the White Squadron sparked an American military revival with new overseas ambitions.¹⁴⁴

At the same time, a group of mostly of them politicians and publicists, among them Theodore Roosevelt, concerned over civil-military relations, tried to balance the liberal tradition of Jefferson and the conservatives. Their school of thought, who combined elements of military and civilian thinking, was labeled as the Neo-Hamiltonian compromise. "The political vehicle of the Neo-Hamiltonians was the Republican Party."¹⁴⁵ Despite the wide agreement over military ethics, their interests were much broader, for example their support for national expansion of national security reasons. They concluded that "the United States Navy must not be the greatest in the world, ... but it must be a battleship navy."¹⁴⁶ On the one side they wanted to prevent an arms race with Great Britain, but on the other side, they desired a navy strong enough to accomplish the national interests of the United States. For this reasons, Roosevelt "urged the construction of a system of naval bases in the new possessions, including the Philippines."¹⁴⁷

By the time the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, American industry proved itself adept in converting to the swift production of destroyers. In about one year, the United States builds 248 destroyers.¹⁴⁸ The importance of the economic factor of war was not correctly appraised before 1914 in Europe and 1917 in the United States.¹⁴⁹ The involvement of the whole

¹⁴⁴ Weigley, p. 170.

¹⁴⁵ Huntington, p. 271.

¹⁴⁶ Weigley, p. 182.

¹⁴⁷ Weigley, p. 187.

¹⁴⁸ Weigley, p. 194. One destroyer was built in only 45 days.

¹⁴⁹ The economic factor was even decisive during the Civil War for the victory of the union over the confederation. "The North's manpower and material resources were superior to the South's, a fact which is proverbial; but they were not limitless." Weigley, p. 129.

population in a total world war was a new experience for the United States with consequences on the civil-military relations.

“After 1918 the military made every effort to continue the war-time identification with American society and expanded the Neo-Hamiltonian link with the American community.”¹⁵⁰ The war changed the civil-military relations from isolation to participation. With the National Defense Act of 1920, the new primary mission of the army was training of civilians for the National Guard and the organized Reserve. The combination of the military and civic instruction through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program in universities and the summer camps for youth brought the army close to the people and “the Army was becoming a participating member of the American society.”¹⁵¹

The instructions to the military about the civilian components in particular required a new type of officer with a new outlook. “The character of the Army must reflect the character of the American people – American ideas, ideals, and thoughts.”¹⁵² “Officers were told to abandon the appearance of exclusiveness and to develop a ‘fellow-feeling for all citizens’. In training the citizen-soldier, the officer must rely upon ‘cooperative spirit’ rather than discipline.”¹⁵³ Officers were advised to build up a good relationship with the leading members of the society and to get integrated in the middle-class business America.

The Regular Army was declared to be one of ‘the greatest agencies in the nation in the teaching of good citizenship’.”¹⁵⁴ The Army’s new educational activities led to political controversy over the red scare, pacifist ideas and political radicals who opposed the military and the government. Growing opposition to military ideals and the military education program with anti-military propaganda produced a national reaction from the military; they called themselves “true Americans” and “one hundred per cent patriotic.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Huntington, p. 282.

¹⁵¹ Huntington, p. 283.

¹⁵² Huntington, p. 284.

¹⁵³ Huntington, p. 284.

¹⁵⁴ Huntington, p. 285.

¹⁵⁵ Huntington, pp. 286-287.

By the end of the 1920s most Americans wished to retain their policies of political isolation and passive defense.¹⁵⁶ As result, the societal opposition to military ideas was so strong that “it was impossible for the military to maintain their identification with the community.”¹⁵⁷

Underlying the change of American society toward the military were the liberal tradition, the renewal of business pacifism, the continuing distrust of government and the distaste for military affairs, with the belief that the military was inherently inefficient and largely unnecessary. Huntington’s conclusion about the Neo-Hamiltonian compromise was:

The military effort to bridge the gap to society had been a failure. The triumphs of antimilitarism were not due to Bolshevism, but to the natural apathy of the American people, their inherent dislike for war, they’re linking of the military with war, and their faith in a future of peaceful progress. The Neo-Hamilton compromise was impossible in the postwar world. ... Rejected again, there was nothing for the military to do, but to retreat back to their prewar isolation and find interest and satisfaction in the mundane duties of their profession.¹⁵⁸

5. Pre Second World War 1930 – 1939

As explained in Chapter II, the degree to which there is civil-military relations conflict depends on the intensity of security. For America this problem of balancing the functional and societal imperatives didn’t exist until 1941,¹⁵⁹ because America had, up to this time, little reason to worry about her national security. Huntington describes the situation as follow:

¹⁵⁶ Trask, p. 20.

¹⁵⁷ Huntington, p. 287.

¹⁵⁸ Huntington, p. 288. In a footnote Huntington explains that the change in the point of main interest of the Army could be seen in the changing content of the Army’s foremost professional magazine, the Infantry Journal. It changed from articles with political issues to more strictly professional topics such as technical military problems. This example shows Huntington’s approach to military professionalism as only military technical agenda. If a military body is involved in politics it can’t be a professional military. Huntington, pp. 80-97.

¹⁵⁹ Goralski, Robert, World War II Almanac, 1931-1945, A Political and Military Record, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981, p. 186, the attack on Pearl Harbor at December 7th, 1941, was the first direct threat to U.S. territory.

Security was given of nature and circumstances, an inheritance rather than a creation. When Americans did consider military policy, they dealt with immediate practical issues such as the size of Army's budget or the number of battleships in the Navy. ... Civil-military relations were limited to the impact of military institutions upon domestic economic and political values and institutions. ... The primary question was what pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values?¹⁶⁰

Before the Second World War (1939) the U.S. military was a very small volunteer force with 334,473¹⁶¹ members. Enlisted men came from working-class or rural origins. Officers came over proportionally from the Southern Protestant middle class. The U.S. military at this time can be characterized as being separated from the civilian society. The Army was a "garrison force predicated upon military tradition, ceremony, hierarchy, and authority."¹⁶²

B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1939

As Charles Moskos¹⁶³ explains, that there are distinctions to be made between the armed services itself and between war and peacetime duty, stateside and overseas assignments¹⁶⁴ in the relationship to the American civilian society. For the assessment he uses his convergent-divergent model of armed forces and society. Affected by technology, organizational structure, and bureaucratic and military values, the Air Force in peacetime tends to converge with civilian structure, somewhat less, the Navy or the Army. The most significant divergence from the civilian society can be seen in the Marine Corps, which tries more than the other services "to sever a recruit's tie to his or her previous life,"¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ Huntington, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ Goralski, p. 422.

¹⁶² Moskos, p. 274.

¹⁶³ Moskos, p. 272.

¹⁶⁴ The relationship to the host country civilian society is not part of this paper.

¹⁶⁵ Ricks, Thomas E., The widening gap between the military and the society, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, p. 68.

and to make them a member of the elite force with self-discipline and deep morale values and the consciousness of military responsibility.

One criterion which shows how the military is integrated into civilian society is the way in which the membership of the armed forces is representative of the broader society.

This relationship between military and civilian structure has changed through several distinctive phases since 1939, which will be shown in the following section.

1. Civil-Military Relations during the Second World War

World War II changed the American civil-military relations patterns that had prevailed since 1865.¹⁶⁶ By 1945, the military had become mass armed forces with peak strength of over 12 million¹⁶⁷ members. Most of the soldiers were conscripts or draft-induced volunteers, serving only for the duration of the war. "The typical servicemen were essentially a civilian in uniform; a man who found distasteful the traditional military forms of command, discipline, and social control."¹⁶⁸ In summary, the U.S. military during the Second World War was socially representative of American society, but the internal organization was in strong contrast to the civilian life.

Even before the war, in President Franklin Roosevelt, the armed forces found a Commander in Chief willing and able to provide the direction and guidance that army and navy officers so desperately desired.¹⁶⁹ In 1939 Roosevelt provided his new army chief, General Marshall, and his new navy chief, Admiral Stark, who were in full command of their field forces and their staffs, with a direct link to him. He transferred the Joint Board from the existing

¹⁶⁶ With the exception of the end of the First World War, when the United States went to war in April 1917 until November 1918.

¹⁶⁷ Goralski, p. 422.

¹⁶⁸ Moskos, p. 274.

¹⁶⁹ Stroler, Mark A., Allies and Adversaries, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000, pp. 15-16.

service department to the newly created Executive Office of the President to coordinate foreign policy with national military strategy. With this shift, the Joint Board became a true national strategic board which provided advice directly to the Commander in Chief.¹⁷⁰ The President tried to improve the command structure for the environment of a 20th century war.

From 1941 on, the military, being directly linked with the Commander in Chief enlarged their sphere of influence¹⁷¹ and ran the war in “the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run.”¹⁷² On the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared¹⁷³ between military and civilian agencies.”¹⁷⁴

Professional military leaders, like General Marshall¹⁷⁵, gained political power due to the condition of war and had no choice but to accept. This weakened the civilian control and in Huntington’s opinion, also the military professionalism.

“The military attitude toward civilian control changed completely during the war.”¹⁷⁶ The aim of the military was to keep as much influence as possible as they moved into the postwar years, by building a permanent body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who “should be responsible only to the President and that

¹⁷⁰ Stroler, p. 16.

¹⁷¹ The Joint Chiefs extended their activities far beyond the normal military tasks, into the areas of “diplomacy, politics and economics.” They compensated for the absence of a war council, however, by being closely connected to the President. Huntington, pp. 322-323.

¹⁷² “Harmony reigned between the President and his military advisors,” the Joint Chiefs, as they adopted civilian goals. Huntington, p. 322.

¹⁷³ Continuous opposing interests clashed between civilian and military agencies over the control of the economy. (Hull and Nelson) Stroler, p. 156. However the American economic mobilization was an outstanding process. Finally, after the feasible dispute about the needs of nation’s civilians and military requirements of 1942 and 1943, the military determined the requirements and the civilian agencies how to produce. Huntington, pp. 342-343.

¹⁷⁴ Huntington, p. 315.

¹⁷⁵ Huntigton compares the American officer corps of the Second World War with the German forces of the First World War and General Marshall with Ludendorf. However, he insisted that the American officers never had the domestic power as the Germans 30 years earlier had, and that the American officers became agents of American liberalism instead of German nationalism. Huntington, p. 316.

¹⁷⁶ Huntington, p. 335.

the JCS should advise the President on the national defense budget.”¹⁷⁷ A variety of different military plans about political-military coordination for military strategy and national security were rejected. There was a resistance to centralize military power. The legislature questioned whether all the power of the national defense should be given to one man, the Secretary of Defense. In 1947, the National Security Act was signed to ensure effective inter-service coordination. The law created a single civilian position, the Secretary of Defense, who became a member of the President’s Cabinet. In addition, the three services¹⁷⁸ were headed by departmental services. “The professional military heads of the services became members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby formalized that ad hoc wartime organization.”¹⁷⁹ However, the Secretary of Defense was weak, with a lot of responsibilities, but no organizational power. His office was strengthened by the new Department of Defense (DOD), which came into existence two years later, when the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 was passed.¹⁸⁰

2. Civil-Military Relations after the Second World War

The combinations of technologic developments and a change in international politics after the Second World War have led to security being the final goal of policy. The question became, “what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?” Janowitz describes the situation as follows:

A reversion to the traditional discipline patterns of the interwar years was a real possibility. However, the increased complexity of military technology and the continuous pressure of worldwide

¹⁷⁷ Huntington, p. 336.

¹⁷⁸ Air Force became in 1947 an own independent service.

¹⁷⁹ Trask, p. 33.

¹⁸⁰ Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Course S 400/3, Resource Planning and Force Management, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 2002, p. 1-3. Further amendments to strengthen the Department of Defense were released in 1953 and 56, as an aftermath of the Korean War.

military operations ruled out a reemergence of old-fashioned garrison life.¹⁸¹

During the following post-war years, a discussion arose regarding the future of the armed forces. On one side, there was the pressure from the population to reduce the military and do more for social welfare. "Cost reductions could be achieved by reducing the regular Army and canceling Truman's proposal for universal military training (UMT)."¹⁸² On the other side, there was the question about national security and how to oppose the 175 Soviet divisions, since the United States was unable to match the Soviet Union in manpower. Therefore, asymmetric military capabilities, for example, the development of the atomic bomb, and technical advantages like Air Force strategic bombers and Navy flush-deck carriers had to be used in order to balance the need of staying competitive with the Soviet military power with the need to keep military costs in the national budget low. Under these conditions, the U.S. military quickly reduced its forces.

In summary, the civil-military relations in the post-war era can be characterized by the "heightened and persistence peacetime tensions between military imperatives and American liberal society."¹⁸³ However, the Cold War intensified the threat to American national security. "The distinction between war and peace had disappeared in a new era of permanent preparedness that embraced every segment of the nation's society and economy."¹⁸⁴ This shifted the emphasis of foreign policy from one of diplomacy to one of military security policy and its military requirements. A result was that "professional officers assumed nonmilitary roles in government, industry, and politics, and developed affiliation with nonmilitary groups."¹⁸⁵ Despite this, the increased military influence was not accompanied by the acceptance of the professional military

¹⁸¹ Janowitz, p. xvii.

¹⁸² Hogan, Michael J., A Cross of Iron, Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. Cambridge: University Press, 1998, p. 100.

¹⁸³ Huntington, p. 345.

¹⁸⁴ Hogan, p. 209.

¹⁸⁵ Huntington, p. 354.

point of view about military demands and requirements. The difference in attitudes between that of the professional military and that of the traditional liberal American civilian could be seen in the issues of universal military training (UMT) and the size of military budget.¹⁸⁶ “The worth of the military profession has been historically rooted in the importance of its non-military functions,”¹⁸⁷ such as the Corps of Engineers in flood control of the Mississippi or the Coast Guard in saving lives during heavy storms.

3. The Cold War and the Korean War

“From 1945 on, Truman tried his best to reconcile the demands of the warfare state with the needs of the welfare state.”¹⁸⁸ In a view of the Cold War as a permanent state of national emergency, the distinction between war and peace had dissolved. The constant threat of Communism and the prevailing myth of unpreparedness in 1950 supported the critics’ accusation that Truman was responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War.¹⁸⁹ Despite the critics, the Truman administration had “created a mobilization base from which the Pentagon was able to launch a larger scale and a faster pace than in the early part of World War II.”¹⁹⁰ Convinced that the Soviet Union was seeking for “world domination,”¹⁹¹ the Truman administration decided to counter the Soviet threat in every corner of the world. Therefore, they “rehabilitated the Germans, rearmed the Europeans, and strengthened the NATO.”¹⁹² In 1951 the administration asked Congress to enact the draft on a permanent basis¹⁹³, to establish a program of UMT in accordance with the tradition of the citizen soldier and to

¹⁸⁶ A balanced budget raised again the question of guns or butter. Hogan, pp. 100-101.

¹⁸⁷ Janowitz, p. 439.

¹⁸⁸ Hogan, p. 312.

¹⁸⁹ Hogan, p. 313, the anti-Communist crusade (McCarthyism) in the United States was led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, who also made President Truman responsible, for not being prepared for War on the Korean peninsula.

¹⁹⁰ Hogan, p. 313.

¹⁹¹ Hogan, p. 317.

¹⁹² Hogan, p. 318.

¹⁹³ The traditional citizen’s duty to defend the state through wartime should now become a permanent obligation.

prevent overspending the budget. A few argued that America must “depart from the anti-militaristic tradition of the peace-love.”¹⁹⁴ Critics expressed their misgivings in the metaphor of the garrison state and connected UMT with Japan and Germany, both which militarized their societies. The fear was that the United States was on the way to a permanent war, with increased military expansion and meddling in the affairs of foreign countries. The most dangerous challenge was “an overgrown military establishment that rivaled civilian leadership.”¹⁹⁵ As a result of this controversy, the decision on UMT was postponed indefinitely. The present circumstances however, required the draft system with a selective service which was compatible with American tradition.¹⁹⁶

During the whole ‘Cold War Period’, with the exception of the emergency build-ups for the Korean (1950 – 1953) and Vietnam War (1965 – 1973), technical specialization became the persuasive trend throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The proportion of soldiers assigned to non-combat units rose strongly. The NATO doctrine of nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation supported the growth of the Air Force with its electronic and technical specialties. Therefore, by 1960, the Army, Navy and Air Force were equally balanced.¹⁹⁷ These technical skill requirements made it necessary to have a degree as a prerequisite for an officer’s commission. Nevertheless, the aim was to increase the numbers of minorities and different religious groups. Above all, there were a growing number of military elites, which achieved top positions in the corporate and political world. At this time “a convergence in the manager skills required in both the civilian and military organization”¹⁹⁸ could be seen.

However, the military life for enlisted men in the army was still very traditional. They came mostly from working or lower-middle-class backgrounds and only partially represented the American society. The growing number of

¹⁹⁴ Hogan, p. 319.

¹⁹⁵ Hogan, p. 320.

¹⁹⁶ Hogan, pp. 312-322.

¹⁹⁷ Moskos, p. 275.

¹⁹⁸ Moskos, p. 275.

college-educated enlisted men became more and more a special problem for the old NCOs. Only the upper-middle-class men served as officers.

4. The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War (1965 – 1973) was the “central professional problem for the military. The Vietnam frustrations further exposed career officers to links between political and military factors in the battle zone.”¹⁹⁹ The more basic transformation was the “gradual movement away from a draft based armed forces; thereby slowing, even, in some aspects, reversing the ‘civilianization’ trend.”²⁰⁰

After the Vietnam War, a reversed trend toward divergence of the military from the civilian society was exhibited. The most significant factors were recruitment, the role of welfare, the racial relations, skill transferability, the family life, overseas deployments, the citizen soldier, and antimilitarism, as outlined below.²⁰¹

- Recruitment: The all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War significantly reduced the participation of the middle-class population as enlisted soldiers. The entirely college educated officer corps produced an educational gap between the enlisted men and officers. This changed in the 1990s, with higher numbers of enlisted men with college educations.
- Welfare Role: The “Project 100,000”²⁰² which started in 1966 accepted recruits, which were normally excluded from military service. For example, those with health problems or no high school education. This project opened the lower-class manpower for the all-volunteer force. In combination with “Project Transition”, which provides job skills for the

¹⁹⁹ Janowitz, p. x.

²⁰⁰ Janowitz, p. x, this did not mean a return to the former self-contained and socially distinct military force, because the requirements of technology, education, and political involvement made that impossible.

²⁰¹ Moskos, pp. 277-289.

²⁰² Janowitz, p. x, there was opposition from the military about this program.

civilian life before leaving the armed forces, the military was becoming an institution, which was being used to correct America's socio-educational and structural failures. However, this revealed that the lower classes were replacing the middle-class as enlisted soldiers, in a trend from conscription to volunteer forces.

- Racial Relations: "The transition of the armed forces from a totally segregated institution (through World War II) into a fully integrated organization (during and immediately following the Korean War) was an impressive achievement in directed social change."²⁰³ African Americans are over-proportionately represented in the ground forces, combat and combat support units, and at NCO levels. This reflects the attractiveness of the military career to minorities of the lower class, with the advantage of climbing the social ladder.
- Skill transferability: The trend to replace military servicemen with civilians in support-type military functions was unbroken. This kind of outsourcing of support tasks to contractors like Brown & Roots reduces the number of soldiers with civilian skills, which can be transferred directly to civilian jobs after the military, thus making additional education and training necessary. Moreover, this creates a kind of true warrior mentality in the military. Everything else, which is not focused directly on fighting skills, should be done by civilians. Overall, this widens the gap between military and civil society.
- Family life: A great variety of privileges, such as free medical care, PX and commissary usage, and government housing areas, or housing allowances were established to meet the needs of military families. In addition, Armed Forces Community Services, Moral, Welfare and Recreation institutions provide a wide range of services for all military families in their own military world. As a result, this is diminishing the tie with the civil society.

²⁰³ Moskos, p. 279.

- Overseas Forces: This extended permanent overseas duty outside of one's own country is "next to combat, the most distinguishing characteristic of the American military, compared to civilian life."²⁰⁴ To relieve this burden, the armed forces have built up their own military communities on foreign soil, embedded in their American way of life. The connection that soldiers have with the host country depends on their own personal attitudes and even more importantly, on their language skills. Overall, the overseas tours reinforce divergence from the American civilian society.
- Citizen-soldier: "From the historical perspective, the concept of the citizen soldier has been a central premise of military thinking in the United States."²⁰⁵ The typically traditional citizen soldier in the U.S. military is a member of the non-active forces, the reserve which consists of the Federal Reservists, under Pentagon administration, and the National and Air Guard units, under state control in peace time. As a general rule, these military personnel attend four one-week drill meetings and two weeks of summer training per year. The members of the Reserve are able to build a bridge between the military community and the civil society.
- Anti-militarism: From the historical point of view, the American population has looked upon its military with some disfavor and traditionally paid low regard to members of the armed forces. The "honeymoon" between the military establishment and the American public since the attack of Pearl Harbor came to an end with new anti-militarism during the Vietnam War.²⁰⁶ The threat from the Soviet Union in the 1980s and President Reagan's idea of "star wars" reconciled the public with its military. The 1991 Gulf War, authorized by the UN and supported by a big coalition, found full support from the majority of the American population. The relationship between the soldiers and their

²⁰⁴ Moskos, p. 285.

²⁰⁵ Moskos, p. 286.

²⁰⁶ Moskos, pp. 288-290.

Commander in Chief then deteriorated under President Clinton.²⁰⁷ The attack on 11th September 2001 was a new start for the civil-military relationship and reinstalled supporting the soldiers, especially during wartime, as a patriotic duty.

Having learned a few lessons, the United States started two main institutionalized changes in the area of political control and joint warfare:

- Strengthening of dual control: As a consequence of the Vietnam War, the War Power Act was enacted in 1973, which gives Congress better control over the military. It placed limitations on the initiation of military interventions by the executive branch. Such initiatory actions could not continue for more than 60 days without precipitating congressional review. "If Congress did not approve the executive action, the president would have to withdraw the troops."²⁰⁸
- Strengthening the joint interactions between command and control: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reorganized the Department of Defense and influenced the balance in civil-military relations. The Act removed the responsibility for resources²⁰⁹ from the military staff and placed it into the hands of civilian secretaries.²¹⁰ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President. In addition, the CJCS became the authority over strategic planning, readiness management, and joint doctrine. Therefore he assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The Joint Staff (JS), as well as the Chairman's staff, is supporting him. Furthermore, the act enhanced the powers of the currently nine unified commanders (Commanders in

²⁰⁷ Kohn, Richard H., The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, Naval War College Review, Summer 2002, Vol. L.V., No. 3, p. 10.

²⁰⁸ Trask, p. 41.

²⁰⁹ The resourcing functions are for example, acquisition, research and development (R&D), financial and information management.

²¹⁰ Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Resource Planning and Force Management, Fort Leavenworth, October 2002, Course S400/3, p. 1-3.

Chiefs – CINCs) over their service components and streamlined the chain of command directly from the President and Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. Overall, the act emphasized joint professional military education and increased the value of joint over service assignments.²¹¹

In summary, the convergence of the armed forces and American society began with the Second World War and continued during the Cold War, with a reversal period during the Vietnam War and the following years. The bases of military recruitment, especially after the introduction of the all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War, shifted away from representation by all classes of American youth to representation primarily by youth from society's lower classes. The military became an additional task, social engineering for America's under-classes.²¹² Divergence between armed forces and society was reflected in the critical scrutiny over the military's budget and the demands of the forces.²¹³ It did not lead to a reduction of the military budget, but rather to supporting essentially America's global political, economic, and military interests.

5. Civil-Military Relations after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War marked a shift of paradigm, because there was a change from the confrontation of two opposing political systems with mutual deterrence to a multi-polar world with new uncertainties. Western states, especially the United States, began to feel vulnerable to terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In August 1998, Secretary of State Madeline Albright called terrorism conducted by non-state entities as "the war of the future."²¹⁴ Only three years later, America was attacked on her own soil and went to war against

²¹¹ Shalikashvili, John M., Joint Force Quarterly, A Word from the Chairman, Washington D.C., Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996, pp. 5-6.

²¹² Moskos, p. 290.

²¹³ Hogan, p. 93 and Moskos, p. 291,

²¹⁴ New York Times, August 21, 1998, p. A1, Moskos, Williams and Segal, p. 17

terrorism. The uncertainty has changed to fear and the knowledge that the United States is vulnerable to asymmetric war.

The civil-military relations in the 1990s deteriorated, especially during the Clinton administration.²¹⁵ As Richard H. Kohn pointed out in the Naval War College Review, he is convinced, “that civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the character of American government and undermine national defense.”²¹⁶ One of his reasons is the historic trend of the military in enlarging its sphere of influence. The Clinton administration treated the military with fear. Clinton himself reflected the post Vietnam Democratic Party, he had never served in uniform, knew little or nothing about military affairs or national security, had a misconception of moral and abolished the ban on open homosexuality in the service immediately, without consultation or estimation of the impact on the military. The administration avoided any public discussion about what role the United States should play in the world. As a result, there was a lack of a national security strategy and consequently, an insufficiency in resources needed to meet the prerequisites for the revolution in military affairs simultaneously with the operational commitments in peace keeping operations.²¹⁷ The impact on moral in combination with the economic prosperity contributed to the loss of many middle-rank officers and the decline in recruitment. The military reacted in a political rightward shift and became more politically active than ever before.²¹⁸

The impact of technological developments has had the consequence of civilianizing the military profession and reducing the distinction between the military and the civilian. The fighter spirit,²¹⁹ a traditional characteristic of military leadership, was pushed into the background, and instead, the technical skills which were necessary to use the high tech weapon systems became more

²¹⁵ Commanders had to remind their subordinates of their constitutional and legal obligation not to speak derogatorily of the civilian leadership.

²¹⁶ Kohn, 2002, p. 9.

²¹⁷ Kohn, 2002, pp. 13 – 14.

²¹⁸ Ricks, Thomas E., The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1997, p. A20, In 1996, 67% of the military personnel considered itself as Republican instead of 33% in 1976.

²¹⁹ Fighter spirit can be defined as “psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety,” Janowitz, p. 32.

important. However, “the pervasive requirements of combat set the limits to civilianizing tendencies.”²²⁰ Instead of profit motivated free enterprises, the military requires a sense of duty and honor to accomplish its objectives, which means in the worst case, to sacrifice the life to fulfill the task and order.²²¹ This could not be compensated for alone by money, but also required a new sense of patriotism and an elite professional fighter image.²²²

After the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the new conservative Bush W. administration changed the military budget policy, called for a War against Terrorism and brought the military and civilian society in a wave of patriotism closer together.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PRAXIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

Since 1939, with the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, American presidents, especially Roosevelt, have taken a much more active role in the integrated national security and military police. As Commander in Chief, the president has the final decision in command authority. However, as head of the executive branch, he is subject to the checks-and-balance system of the legislative and judicial branches. The responsibility for national security and defense matters is delegated to the National Security Council (NSC) and to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State.

The Department of Defense (DOD) was established by the National Security Act Amendment of 1949 and is headed by a civilian, the Secretary of Defense. The president appoints the Secretary of Defense with the advice and consent of the Senate. The task of the DOD is to establish policies and procedures for the government relating to national securities. It includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the

²²⁰ Janowitz, pp. 33.

²²¹ Military profession is a profession which performs a crucial ‘life and death’ task, Janowitz, p. 175.

²²² Like in the special forces, ranger, navy seals and marine corps members, where moral values have the highest level within the armed forces, Ricks, Thomas E., The Widening GAP between the military and society, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 66 – 78.

Department of the Army, the Navy (including U.S. Marine Corps), and the Air Force. Furthermore, specified and unified Commands, defense agencies, and DOD field activities are under the head of the DOD.

The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the president for military matters; he has the right to report directly to the president and the authority to exercise direction and control over all elements of the DOD. The line of operational command goes from the Secretary of Defense directly to the specified and unified commanders. The JCS are not in the chain of command, they are responsible for strategic and tactical planning in the true sense of the word 'joint'. The three military departments have responsibility for training, administrative, and logistic support of the specified and unified commands.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense is the chief of many assistants and advisors during the decision making process. This begins with his position of chairman the most important advisory body, the Armed Forces Policy Council,²²³ which provides advice and formulation of broad defense policy.

The President and the Secretary of Defense have the authority and direction over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman of the JCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. The JCS²²⁴ serve as advisors and joint staff to the specified and unified commanders. The JCS prepares strategic plans and provides strategic direction for the armed forces. "It reviews the plans and programs of the specified and unified commands, major personnel and logistic requirements, and establishes a unified doctrine."²²⁵ The Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency, over which the JCS has operational control, support the JCS. The National Military Command and Control System (NMCC) receives data from various command and control centers, including the National Security Agency and provides information (which was previously analyzed by the

²²³ The council consists of the Secretary of Defense and his deputy, the secretaries of the three departments, the Undersecretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps.

²²⁴ The JCS are, the chairman of JCS, chief of staff U.S. Army, chief of naval operations, chief of staff U.S. Air Force, the commandant of the Marine Corps.

²²⁵ Benton, Jeffrey C., Air Force Officer's Guide, 31st Edition, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1996p. 55.

Joint Staff) to the JCS, State Department Operations Center or Situation Room in the White House, where decisions are made.

In summary, the American society was very reluctant to design a 20th century order of command and control over the military. Traditional concepts prevailed until the threat of a necessary homeland defense occurred in 1941. The fear of uncontrolled military power kept the military command divided in a system of checks and balances. The conditions of a constant threat during the Cold War and the prerequisite of military command as a global superpower enforced the development of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. Changed military requirements made adjustments in the Department of Defense necessary. The Goldwater-Nicholson Act strengthened the joint warfare capabilities and streamlined the chain of command from the President to the unified commanders (CINCs). The success in both wars against Iraq was based on the decision making process, the continued adjustment of the civilian control over the military and the command and control system of the United States Armed Forces itself.

Since September 11th, 2001, the United States has been surfing on a wave of patriotism, which has diminished the traditional fear of uncontrolled military power. In addition, the bush administration is much more willing to exercise military power in order to accomplish its goals in the war against Terrorism. The society and the legislature are willing to give the military and other security institutions more power and rights than ever before.²²⁶ This shows a new acceptance by the public to be willing to limit the freedom of individuals in the effort to win the war against Terrorism. This however, conveys unknown risks for the future of civil-military relations.

²²⁶ Senate and Congress passed the USA Patriot Act in the immediately response of "emergency measures" to the terrorists' attacks of September 11, 2001. The President signed it on October 26, 2001 under extraordinary circumstances that threatened national security. The purpose is, "to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. The act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. It vests the Secretary of the Treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions for foreign money laundering purposes.

D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND SOCIAL LIFE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

The current officer guide²²⁷ gives following advice of behavior in relation to civil power:

It's important that you know where your loyalty lies. Under our system of government, you have a dual allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, which you swore to uphold, and to the president as commander in chief. In this system of divided civilian supremacy – between the president and the Congress – over armed forces, you must not allow yourself to become involved in the tug of war between the administration and the Congress. You should keep informed about politics, and it is your duty to vote, but on active duty you should not speak publically about your personal views on political policy. If you can't support established policy, you should take the honorable course and resign.²²⁸

In relations with civilians, the recommendation is to maintain favorable relationships. All officers are public affairs officers, sources of information about the armed forces. Their pattern of conduct should be as a sober, responsible citizen of the civilian community. The officer guide recommends the following behavior:

Officers should take a full part in the life of the civilian community. Be sociable with your neighbors. Become a member of their clubs, societies, and churches. Take your share in community enterprise. In short, be a good neighbor, a respected and desired neighbor.²²⁹

The principles of the officer code are patriotism, honor, courage, loyalty, discipline, readiness, frugality, caution, sense of responsibility, teamwork, ambition, adaptability, ascendancy of the civil power and relations with civilians.

²²⁷ Each service has a own Officer's Guide to help officers in their professional careers. The first Army Officer's Guide appeared in 1930. It sets a code of principles to which all officers aspire, both in official duty and their personal behavior.

²²⁸ Benton, pp. 11 – 12.

²²⁹ Benton, p. 13.

For the issue of civil-military relations the last two points are particularly interesting.

The officer's guide describes professionalism in the following terms:²³⁰

Sure skill and knowledge relative to the particular task assigned to, but with ultimate responsibilities. The job must be performed at maximum efficiency, routinely, prudently, smoothly and calm under all circumstances, without noise or heroic, without unnecessary risk or extravagant use of resources.

All soldiers should constantly seek to heighten and broaden their competence at every level of their career.

One element of professionalism is the customs of the service is the behavior with politic issues:

Stay out of politics. Don't become embroiled in politics. Political activity is contrary to American military tradition. As a citizen, you have right to your opinions and a duty to vote, but keep your opinions to yourself, within your home, or within your own circle of friends. You can do this without being an intellectual eunuch. Also remember that criticism of the president is particularly improper because the president is, after all, the CINC of the armed forces.²³¹

The advice not to criticize the President is based on Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)²³² and was violated constantly during the second period of the Clinton administration, which had led to the reprimand of officers.²³³

²³⁰ Benton, p. 80.

²³¹ Benton, p. 142.

²³² Article 88 UCMJ, the provision about contemptuous words against the highest civilian officials.

²³³ Kohn, p. 11.

1. Social Life in the Armed Forces²³⁴

It is expected that service in the armed forces is more than a job, it is a way of life. Janowitz described the military profession as “more than an occupation; it is a complete style of life. The officer is a member of a community whose claims over his daily existence extend well beyond his official duties.”²³⁵

Members of the American armed forces generally have a choice, to live on the base in government quarters or live off base in a civilian community. If the choice is for latter one, soldiers are advised to become active participants in the social activities of their communities. They should seek to create a good impression on the civil neighborhood, as it is the soldier’s duty in a foreign country as an ambassador of the United States. In addition, it is helpful that soldiers and their families become members of the churches, societies, and clubs of the civilian community and participate in the civic activities. In summary, be a good neighbor.

The services are aware of the unhappiness resulting from military rotation and are sensitive to the needs of their families. “They have developed a highly effective ‘welfare state’, with on-base housing or military communities, family, medical, and social services.”²³⁶ This trend represents one of the most powerful counter-forces to civilianization. Nevertheless, the military community recognizes that it cannot detach itself from the tensions of social change. “Its members are avid consumers of mass media content, and their strong interest in public affairs renders them more broadly informed than comparable professional families.”²³⁷

Janowitz added, that in comparison to the American civilian society, “professional officers think of themselves as bearers of the positive values of American society and as subject to higher standards of behavior than civilians.”²³⁸ The logic of the professional officer is “that he is supposed to

²³⁴ Benton, p. 190.

²³⁵ Janowitz, p. 175.

²³⁶ Janowitz, p. xxxiii.

²³⁷ Janowitz, p. xxxiv.

²³⁸ Janowitz, p. xxxvii.

perform his assignment, request a transfer, or resign from service in a matter-of-fact fashion, on the basis of his skills, aptitudes, and basic beliefs, without undue display of personal mood or sentiment.”²³⁹ “Officers are concerned, like men in any profession, with their prestige.”²⁴⁰ In the United States the polls show that the ranking of the military officer is very high.²⁴¹ The Harris Poll conducts this survey annually, asking 1,011 randomly selected adults to rate the prestige of 17 professions with this question: “I am going to read off a number of different occupations. For each, would you tell me if you feel it is an occupation of very great prestige, considerable prestige, some prestige or hardly any prestige at all?” In 2002, the result was, that 51% felt scientists have a great prestige, 47% felt that about military officers. At the end of the ranking are the union leaders with 14%.²⁴² “The military has currently a very high standing in public opinion and is a “unique pressure group because of the immense resources under its control²⁴³ and the gravity of its functions”²⁴⁴ for national security. “The effectiveness of the military as a pressure group is enhanced by its unified training and educational system.” ²⁴⁵ This can be seen especially in military higher schools, which develop a strong sense of corporate identity among their members.

One of the most powerful pressure groups is the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is a base from which the members of the senate “are able to act as powerful agents on behalf of defense and defense-related industries.”²⁴⁶ With the power of its pressure group through the Senate Armed Service Committee, the

²³⁹ Janowitz, p. xxxvii.

²⁴⁰ Janowitz, p. xxxviii. Compare Sueddeutsche Zeitung dated 8th of April 2003, only 9% of the German population considers the profession as an officers as a job with high prestige., www.sueddeutsche.de/index.php?url=/lebenstil

²⁴¹ Poll about prestige jobs by CNN Money, 21th, October 2002, Money&Business, Cathryn Conroy, showed that the military officer is one of the most prestige jobs in the United States, ranking on number three after scientists and doctors.

²⁴² CNN Money, 21th, October 2002, Money&Business, Cathryn Conroy

²⁴³ The military-industrial complex represents an important percentage of national resources which has been placed at the disposal of the military.

²⁴⁴ Janowitz, p. xlvii.

²⁴⁵ Janowitz, p. xlvii.

²⁴⁶ Janowitz, p. xlviii.

military has effectively resisted efforts to use the forces in unexpected contingencies in secondary functions, such as natural or manmade disasters and use its facilities in educational and remedial programs. "It felt that such efforts would divert it from basic task, lower the quality of its manpower, and reduce its prestige."²⁴⁷

The Officer Guide and Janowitz describe the military honor as a most important value in connection with political activities. One of the most important issues of civil-military relations is the relationship of the armed service members to political activity. In the most cases political statements and activities are in correlation with military honor.

According to the definitions of military honor, the professional soldier is 'above politics' in domestic affairs. Under democratic theory, the 'above politics' formula requires that, in domestic politics, generals and admirals do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship. Furthermore, military men are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured of the military's partisan neutrality. ...The party neutrality of the military has been assisted by the social and political consensus of American society.²⁴⁸

'Above politics' does not mean to be un-political. The political beliefs of the military are not distinct from those in the civil society. Professional officers are able to distinct between private and expressed beliefs, because of the rules under which they operate. However, they have a tendency to have more conservative attitude.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Janowitz, p. I.

²⁴⁸ Janowitz, p. 233.

²⁴⁹ Janowitz, pp. 235-236. "Military ideology has maintained a disapproval of the lack of order and respect for authority which it feels characterizes civilian society. The military believe that the materialism and hedonism of American culture is blocking the essential military virtues of patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice. In the past most professional soldiers even felt that the moral fibre of American manpower was 'degenerating,' and might not be able to withstand the rigors of battle. The professional soldier has been preoccupied with increased military training, not only for technical reasons, but to overcome the social and moral disabilities and weaknesses generated by civilian society. " Janowitz, p. 248 and Ricks, Thomas E., The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1997, p. A20, in 1996, 67% of the military personnel considers itself as Republican instead of 33% in 1976.

2. Rights, Privileges and Restrictions in the Armed Forces²⁵⁰

When citizens enter military service, their legal status is changing. Some civilian rights are restricted or modified. They take on additional obligations and the risk of sacrificing their lives. That is balanced by additional benefits not enjoyed by civilians. All members of the armed forces are volunteers, who would not join unless the conditions were acceptable. Granting appropriate benefits is necessary to attract good people and hold them in the service.

The following rights are benefits established for military people by federal law: ²⁵¹

- The Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, passed in 1940, still in effect. The purpose is the relief of some of the pressures of heavy financial obligations that they may have assumed in civil life.
- The 'GI Bill of Right' which ensures that retired members and their dependents receive the following beneficiaries: Servicemen's Group Life Insurance; educational aid; guarantee of loans for the purchase or construction of homes, farms, or business property; readjustment allowances for veterans who are unemployed; disability compensation; and more.
- Most important is the medical treatment for members of the armed forces and their families.²⁵² Moreover, there is the right and the honor to be buried in a National Cemetery.
- Every member has the right to complain to the Inspector General of the major command or the branch in general and specially about violation the rights and privileges.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ Benton, p. 209.

²⁵¹ Benton, pp. 212-214.

²⁵² Military Times, Handbook for Military Life, Health Care, Springfield, Army Times Publishing Co., May 2003, p. 32. This handbook, published every year as a supplement of Army Times, gives an overview about the great variety of different health care programs. Most important is the Tricare Option, which is an individual insurance for the active-duty family members and retirees.

²⁵³ Benton, p. 212.

- Purchase of daily-life goods tax-free in the Defense Department Exchange Services, which are supported by civilian companies and organizations.²⁵⁴

On the other side there is a list of restrictions which are limiting the personal freedom:

- It forbids racial discrimination, sexual harassment, fraternization and unprofessional relationships.
- Smoking is prohibited during normal duty hours in all education facilities. Nonsmokers are protected from passive smoking by prohibiting smoking in almost all facilities, including vehicles.
- Additional restrictions in religious accommodation, respect for religious beliefs should not infringe on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or discipline.
- For certain higher government officials, a respectful language is advised. "Any officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, Vice President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, or a Secretary of a Department, a Governor or a legislature of any state, Territory, or other possession of the United States in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."²⁵⁵
- There are more restrictions on business activities, on the acceptance of gifts and on communication with members of the Congress.

In conclusion, the civil-military relations in the United States are based on over two hundred years of experience and tradition. During this time the military has seen good and bad days. However, the Armed Forces have developed the mechanisms of isolation in bad times and survived under reconsidering their true military professional values. On the other hand, in times of good relationships the military was wise enough to expand its spheres. In wartime, politicians are eager

²⁵⁴ Benton, p. 217, Procter & Gamble is providing special offers in the Commissaries and Post Exchange (PX) Stores, McDonalds offers 10% discount for military members in uniform.

²⁵⁵ Benton, p. 223 and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 88.

to reconcile the civilian society with the military, in order to achieve the nations support for their war aims.

This concludes the development of civil-military relations in the United States. The thesis will provide in the following Chapter IV. The development of civil-military relations in Germany.

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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GERMANY

A. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GERMANY

1. Prussia's Development as a State 1640 - 1807

With the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia²⁵⁶ in 1648, an era of religious wars and of profound uncertainty drew to an end. "The age of the absolutist state²⁵⁷ was about to dawn, the power struggle between the monarchs and their estates had been settled, religious confession and the state combined to form an indivisible union."²⁵⁸

The rise of Prussia as a great European power after 1640²⁵⁹ was built on the political will and "the effectiveness of the army which they created."²⁶⁰ The structure of the Prussian military state was based on the army and the peasants. The relatively small numbers of citizens were responsible for delivering the goods that the army needed and in exchange they were given an exemption from the military. The church, the administration and the state treasury built the framework of organization for Prussia. During the eighteenth century, a shift of power from the peasants to the citizens proceeded. The citizens grew in numbers and represented the educated part of the population, which supported the transformation of the Prussian state to a nation. In addition, they delivered the most important weapons for the military, and a growing number replaced the

²⁵⁶ It was signed in Muenster and Osnabrueck

²⁵⁷ The absolute state is governed by a monarch with absolute sovereignty. "Sovereignty applies therefore to the supreme level of political decision, and it implies a power which is by definition absolute and unlimited, it may be exercised only by a single individual, that is, by the monarch, the sole legislator". Schulze, p. 50.

²⁵⁸ Schulze, p. 48.

²⁵⁹ Fredrick William, the Great Elector, assumed the throne of Brandenburg in 1640.

²⁶⁰ Craig, p. 1. Alliances are good, but forces of one's own still better. The key of safety lay in military force. Craig, p. 2.

noble landlords in the officer corps. This shift in power accelerated their importance and they became the most important pillar of the army.

In 1640, Fredrick William, the Great Elector, who had assumed the throne of Brandenburg, had only a few thousand mercenaries as own troops. To replace them with a reliable army became the aim. Therefore, the unfit were purged. Rebellious, blackmailing colonels and foreign mercenaries were discharged. The result was a tiny force of 2,500 men, “the nucleus of the standing army of the future.”²⁶¹ The Elector was able to continue his policy of military expansion to a force of 27,000 men in 1660, by co-opting the noble landowners with absolute ownership in return for the funding of his army. Retired higher officers received state posts in the administration so that his state building was supported with loyal soldiers, and discharged soldiers were established as farmers on royal domains, as a kind of first social welfare program. When the Elector died in 1688, he had changed “the old mercenary system in which colonels contracted to supply the ruler with regiments” toward a “modern system of centralized army” ²⁶² with its own administration and central command, whose officers were servants of the state.

His son, Fredrick William I, assumed the title ‘King in Prussia’ in 1701 and supported the Elector’s belief, “that military power alone could make a ruler considerable.”²⁶³ The first Prussian king respected the realities and recognized the army as the bulwark of his authority²⁶⁴ and spent four times more money annually on the army than on all other obligations. He increased the army to strength of 83,000 men in 1740 by changing it from a volunteer system to recruitment.²⁶⁵ Harsh recruitment led to public indignation and an increase of immigration, which had negative effects upon the economy of the state of

²⁶¹ Craig, p. 3.

²⁶² Craig, pp. 5-6.

²⁶³ Craig, p. 7.

²⁶⁴ In 1724, King Fredrick William I stated, “always keep up a large efficient army; you cannot find a better friend and without that friend you will not be able to survive.” Craig, p. 7.

²⁶⁵ Recruitment meant, in the middle of the eighteenth century, pressing his own subjects and kidnapping from neighboring states.

Prussia.²⁶⁶ To escape these difficulties, service in the standing army became a legal binding²⁶⁷ upon all male subjects in the state of Prussia.²⁶⁸ In 1732, the innovative recruitment procedure was called the Prussian Canton System.²⁶⁹ The time of active duty for conscripts consisted of only two months' drill and a spring exercise every year. Therefore, the army in peacetime had its full strength only in April and May. Even considering all this success, nevertheless, absolutism in Prussia differed from the general traditional image, because the 'King in Prussia' was a relatively weak ruler and "until 1806, the concept of a single Prussian state was unusual. The provinces, with their independent local assemblies were regarded as states in themselves."²⁷⁰ At the county level, within the boundaries of his own estate, the noble landlord, the Junker, was his own master, with almost unlimited authority over his peasantry. As the Junker was subject to the king, so the peasant was subject to the noble landlord. Most important, Prussian nobility was tied to the land, "because their estates could not be sold, and because their status debarred them from any pursuit other than farming."²⁷¹

"Strict decrees banned the Junkers from leaving the country, from studying abroad or from entering the service of a foreign power."²⁷² Therefore, the nobleman had no other "possibility of earning an honest living other than through the only alternative career the King of Prussia offered his noble subjects, a commission in the army."²⁷³ The ruler and his nobles comprised a closed society, the Prussian officer corps, governed by the laws of professional

²⁶⁶ The negative attitude of the colonialists in the United States against a standing Army is not surprising, considering this background of reasons for emigration.

²⁶⁷ It was a universal obligation to serve by law, but in practice liberal exemptions were made in the interest of trade, industry and public service and the burden felt to the peasants.

²⁶⁸ Craig, p. 9.

²⁶⁹ Every regiment was assigned to a specific recruitment district and if quotas by volunteers could not be filled, a difference was made up from the eligibility.

²⁷⁰ Schulze, p. 63.

²⁷¹ Schulze, p. 64.

²⁷² Schulze, p. 64.

²⁷³ Schulze, p. 64.

competence and feudal honor. The nobility regarded the officer corps as its natural profession.²⁷⁴

In 1714, the first comprehensive set of infantry regulations ever to be issued to the army governed every phase of the soldier's life in the garrison.²⁷⁵

The son of Fredrick William I, Fredrick the Great, in 1740 won the military conflict against Maria Theresa over Silesia and enlarged the Prussian state territory. In the following years between 1756 and 1763, during the Seven Years War, Prussia became the symbol of a warlike state. "The common foot-soldier gained the consciousness of his own ability," and "the officer corps became the embodiment of the spirit of devotion to the Crown and state" and together they made "Prussian troops to the finest soldiers in Europe."²⁷⁶

The belief in their own strength remained until 1806, in the battles against Napoleon in Jena and Auerstaedt. The basic weakness of the absolutist system then became obvious. However, the decline of the army and the destruction of the Prussian state started even earlier with the death of Fredrick II in 1786 and a period of transition until 1806. During a period in which Prussians territory was growing the Canton System was not adjusted. "Conscription in the newly acquired provinces was held at a minimum to prevent emigration of the population."²⁷⁷ Deficiencies in recruitment were filled by quotas with foreign mercenaries, which increased until 1804, but were still only a half of full strength army. Full strength was only achieved during the four weeks of royal maneuvers and the training period for new conscripts was reduced to 10 weeks under Fredrick William III, with all the negative impacts on efficiency and discipline.²⁷⁸ A result was the unreliability of a majority bulk of the army, the foundation of the Prussian state. However, even the Prussian army's disappointing campaigns of

²⁷⁴ Craig, p. 11.

²⁷⁵ Craig, p. 12.

²⁷⁶ Craig, p. 13.

²⁷⁷ Craig, p. 23.

²⁷⁸ Craig, p. 24.

1792-1795²⁷⁹ in the coalition wars of the European rulers against France revolutionary armies, “did not seem to have shaken the belief of the average officer that, in any real trial of strength, the Prussian army was unbeatable.”²⁸⁰ Therefore, with the unexpected defeat of the Prussian army²⁸¹ in 1806, the resistance collapsed immediately and Prussia accepted the French occupation, as the mass of the population was used to unquestionable obedience.²⁸² “If a people is accustomed blindly to accept authority, it will experience no great difficulty in transferring its allegiance from one authority to another.”²⁸³ Now Fredrick William III “had no longer an effective fighting force, he had no choice but to agree”²⁸⁴ to Napoleon’s conditions.

2. Prussian Military 1808 – 1879

The history of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was one of a long civil-military struggle over the constitution, in which “the opponents of liberalism, democracy and a constitutional reform” ²⁸⁵ were more successful. In this struggle, the Prussian army first played the most decisive role, followed by the *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht*. Political developments in Prussia and Germany were influenced by the organization of the army.²⁸⁶ It was the political and military reform between 1807 and 1813 which made Prussia’s liberation from France possible and which enabled Prussia to recover as a great power in Europe.

²⁷⁹ Most important, the Battle of Valmy, in 1792, as the first unsuccessful battle of the Prussian army in 150 years.

²⁸⁰ Craig, 32.

²⁸¹ The reason of the defeat was a combination of developments in French tactic improvements (self-contained divisions, individual tirailleurs tactic, and improvement of accuracy of artillery fire) and new equipment (reduction of the weight of guns). Craig, p. 27.

²⁸² The commandant of Berlin posted after the defeat in Jena a proclamation: “The king has lost a battle, calm is the first duty of the citizen!” Craig, p. 18.

²⁸³ Craig, p. 21.

²⁸⁴ Craig, p. 35.

²⁸⁵ Craig, p. xiv.

²⁸⁶ Craig, p. xiv; the Prussian army made the Prussian state.

In 1848, when Prussia was “transformed from an absolute to a constitutional state, the military establishment was not forced to submit to any effective measure of civilian control.”²⁸⁷ Between 1862 and 1866, liberal and democratic politicians achieved partial control over the state. Nevertheless, the leaders of the army defeated the demand that the army should be bound to the new constitution and ensured that the army was responsible to the Crown alone.

3. German Reich 1871 – 1918

After Germany’s unification in 1871, the imperial *Reichstag* received the right to question the War Minister. However, by administrative adjustment, only irresponsible army agencies were required to give answers, rather than the important elements of command, organization and personnel.²⁸⁸ The aim of blocking democracy and parliamentary control was again achieved. Moreover, the mechanization of warfare made it necessary for statesmen to weigh the advice of military staffs concerning military and foreign capabilities.

In 1914, operational plans were adopted which limited the freedom of diplomacy and the courses of action available to the state.²⁸⁹ During the First World War, especially from 1916 on, the German military in the form of the Supreme Command exhibited a powerful and decisive influence over domestic German policy as a whole and subordinated the German economy and society under its control in its effort to win the war.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁷ Craig, p. 342.

²⁸⁸ Craig, p. xv.

²⁸⁹ Craig, p. xvii: Clausewitz, “strategical ideas should never be considered without due consideration of their political implications”.

²⁹⁰ Schulze, p. 272.

3. Weimar Republic 1919 – 1933

At the end of the First World War in November 1918, the dynasty, which the Prussian Army had served since 1640, was swept away, and the German Reich was transformed into a Republic. The burden to lead Germany was laid on the shoulders of the social democrats. They realized that they had a real insecure position, with respect to the radicals and separatists; therefore they welcomed an offer of military support. The majority of the people in the years 1918-1920 were “far more fearful of communism than they were of an unreformed and unregenerate military establishment.”²⁹¹ The military chiefs exploited the fear of communism to their advantage. In 1918/19 President Ebert supported the army in exchange for the suppression of the extreme left.²⁹² In the fights against the People’s Naval Division, the republican defense corps (*Republikanische Soldatenwehr*), Spartacists, and other German communists, the Supreme Command concentrated on raising volunteers, called free corps, and on the formation of the peoples militia (*Volkswehr*).²⁹³ The army had preserved the unity of the young republic and reorganized its forces with volunteers. A union of Socialists, Center and Democratic parties agreed on the first democratic constitution for Germany. To achieve a strong army for internal order and protection of the frontiers, the constitution left the internal administration and the command of the army in the hands of the old officer corps.²⁹⁴ However, the new political leaders believed they had learned from the past. Therefore, the military got a civilian Minister of War and the new *Reichswehr* had to take an oath of obedience to the Constitution of the Republic. However, during the 1920’s, it became clear that the army recognized no real

²⁹¹ Craig, p. 343.

²⁹² The ‘historic pact’ between the new Chancellor of the German Reich, Friedrich Ebert and the quartermaster-general of the German High Command, Wilhelm Groener, was that the army recognized the legitimacy of the new regime and the army would support the government in the combat against communism.

²⁹³ Craig, pp. 356-358.

²⁹⁴ Craig, pp. 361-362.

allegiance to the republican regime.²⁹⁵ In 1920, during the Kapp-Putsch,²⁹⁶ the army under the command of Seeckt, maintained a 'wait and see' neutrality²⁹⁷ and underlined its power inside the state.²⁹⁸ Moreover, the military leaders started to play a role in the foreign politics. It started during the peace treaty negotiations, over the military restrictions and secret military cooperation with Russia since 1923. The civil-military relations deteriorated during the years over the peace treaty, especially over the acceptance of the war-guilt clauses. There was dissatisfaction with the politicians, whom they also blamed for the decisions over conditions of the army, with 100,000 long-term professional soldiers, without the right of political participation.

After the *Kapp-Putsch*, the German army was "transformed from an aggregation of ill-coordinated units with demoralized officer corps into a homogeneous and perfectly disciplined force."²⁹⁹ The best formations of the free corps were absorbed in the *Reichswehr*, the remaining forces of the Black *Reichswehr* were seen as unfit and considered as irregular. In the same years, the individual member of the army was not allowed to participate in politics,³⁰⁰ the army as an institution steadily increased its influence in every aspect of state affairs, especially in foreign affairs. This development caused concern in the parliament; however, the parliamentarians were powerless to control it.³⁰¹ The military leadership understood "its loyalty to the permanent state rather than to the regime of the moment, and its principle duty was to protect the interests of

²⁹⁵ Craig, p. xviii.

²⁹⁶ Coup d'état, lead by a man with the name Kapp.

²⁹⁷ In accordance of the 1848 comradeship, Seeckt's attitude was: "Troops do not fire on troops. ... When *Reichswehr* fires on *Reichswehr*, then all comradeship within the officer corps has vanished." Craig, p. 377.

²⁹⁸ The Generals explained the Defense Minister Noske, that they were "happy to defend the republic against attacks from the left, but they were not prepared to adopt the same position when the rebels claimed to be patriots and nationalists." Craig, p. 377.

²⁹⁹ Craig, p. 382 and p. 393, a elite force with 100,000 military professionals.

³⁰⁰ Seeckt's order: "Any kind of political activity in the Army will be prohibited. Political quarrels within the *Reichswehr* are incompatible with both the spirit of comradeship and with discipline and can only be harmful to military training. Craig, pp. 385-386.

³⁰¹ Craig, p. 382.

that permanent state.”³⁰² As Seeckt stated, the Army “must be granted full freedom in its development and in its way of life (*Eigenleben*).”³⁰³ In 1928, political reform to achieve a democratic army under civilian control was demanded by several socialist deputies in the parliament. But at this time, the parties had more interesting things to do than to worry over army reform. In contrary, the *Reichswehr* Minister Gessler was succeeded by the former general, Wilhelm Groener, and the army ran its internal affairs without civilian interference. Divorced from the society of the state, the army became ‘a state within the state’.

In 1929, after the stock market crash, Germany was under the double stress of its failing economy and its political trouble coming from the extremists. The country seemed to be on the point of total collapse. The military leaders regarded themselves as the protectors of the Reich and played an important domestic role in the long series of crises, which lasted until 1933. In the beginning, they justified their activity as “necessary to prevent the victory of the extremist parties,”³⁰⁴ but the result of their intervention was very unfortunate.³⁰⁵ Especially Groener’s successor as *Reichswehr* Minister, General Kurt von Schleicher,³⁰⁶ tried to coop the Nazis and he was “confident that he would be able to split Hitler’s party and detach important elements on his side.”³⁰⁷ However, Schleicher failed to split the National Socialist party, with the support of Gregor Strasser. On the other hand, Schleicher “brought the influence of the

³⁰² Craig, p. 388.

³⁰³ Craig, p. 388 and pp. 423-424, Seeckt has ties to foreign affairs, financial freedom by black funds, independent administration and his own policy in officer selection.

³⁰⁴ Craig, p. 428 and p. 433, *Reichswehr* Minister Wilhelm Groener attacked the National Socialists, that they were “distinguished from the communists only by the national base on which they take their footing.”

³⁰⁵ “Indeed, there is no period in German history in which representatives of the army intervened more frequently and directly in the internal politics of the country; but it must be added, there is no period in which the result of this intervention was more unfortunate. In their desire to end a political situation which threatened to degenerate into complete anarchy, the military chiefs rashly took upon themselves tasks of political negotiation and partly manipulation for which they were not qualified.” Craig, p. 428.

³⁰⁶ Under the *Reichschancellor*, the former General, Franz von Papen, who was the war-time military attaché in the United States, Craig, p. 455.

³⁰⁷ Craig, p. 454.

army to bear against the Chancellor von Papen and became Chancellor himself in December 1932. Another attempt to convince the Nazis to take part as junior partners in his cabinet failed. *Reichspresident* von Hindenburg, on January 30th, 1933, announced that Hitler would become the German *Reichschancellor*. He had the support of Schleicher, who hoped that “if Hitler assumed the responsibilities of office he would become more moderate in his views and would be susceptible to management by other agencies, notably by the army.”³⁰⁸ On the other side, Hitler himself later admitted, that “if the army had not stood on our side, then we should not be standing here today.”³⁰⁹ The army’s paramount influence in political decisions and “all the mistakes made by political generals in the long history of Prussian army, this was the greatest and, for the nation, the most tragic.”³¹⁰

4. Third Reich 1933 – 1945

The Nazis realized that they could not overthrow the *Weimar Republic* unless they secured at least the sympathetic neutrality of the army. They promised to restore the national spirit after the humiliation of Versailles and to expand the army to defend the interest of the state. This found a sympathetic response in the officer corps in general.³¹¹ After 30 January 1933, within five years, Hitler had accomplished what the liberals of 1848 and 1862, and the republicans and socialists of 1918, had failed to accomplish; “he had completely subordinated the army to his own control.”³¹² One of the most decisive steps accrued shortly after the *Reichschancellor* Hindenburg died in 1934. The soldiers of the *Reichswehr* took the traditional oath to Hitler personally. In so doing, the German soldiers bound themselves to the fate of the dictator.³¹³ The oath

³⁰⁸ Craig, p. 464.

³⁰⁹ Craig, p. 466, speech of 23 September 1933, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, *Nemesis of Power*, p. 285.

³¹⁰ Craig, p. 467.

³¹¹ Craig, p. xviii.

³¹² Craig, p. xix.

³¹³ Abenheim, p. 35.

became a burden and an excuse for fighting the war long after any possibility of victory. During the Second World War, the concept of patriotism (service) seemed to have been irretrievably damaged by Nazism.³¹⁴

5. After Second World War 1945 - 1955

After 1945, many blamed the professional soldiers for the defeat and held them guilty of continuing the war long after all hope of victory had vanished. All symbols and traditions of the soldiers were banned by the victors. De-nazification and reeducation supported the anti-militarism attitude and the postwar German society rejected everything about the military.³¹⁵ Therefore, it was no surprise that the general attitude about rearmament was not positive and that with the young men, the mood "*ohne mich*" ("count me out") for a new army was common.³¹⁶ In 1949, preparations for a new army began. Up until this time, it was not obviously clear how to deal with the historical experience of the role of the military, the relationship between civil and military power, and the future position of the soldier in the state and in society. This controversy over a new type of German soldier, with a new self-image, continued over the following years. The new image had to be acceptable both externally by the new allies and internally by the new democratic West Germany. The French High Commissioner for Germany suggested in 1950 that "the new German government should prevent German generals from influencing domestic politics as they had done in

³¹⁴ Kelleher, Catherine and Fisher, Cathleen, "Germany", in Murray, Douglas J and Viotti, Paul R. (editors), The Defense Policy of Nations. A Comparative Study, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 181.

³¹⁵ Abenheim, p. 12.

³¹⁶ Gordon A. Craig wrote in the foreword to Abenheim's book "Reforging the Iron Cross" that the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* gave, on 10 November 1954, an explanation about the strong emotional opposition to military service in Germany. The author Paul Sethe wrote, "the military tradition was broken off in 1945. In the nine years since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming amongst young people, which make it difficult to link up with this heritage. Two lost wars with their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in rubble for a long to come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice have been brutally abused and arouse today only bitterness among many; the long struggle of the occupiers against German soldierly pride has not been without effect; the division of Germany paralyzes many."

the 1920s.”³¹⁷ In the area of domestic politics, the question about the political and social positions of the new soldiers in state and society needed an answer. On the other hand, the military leaders also worried about the motivation and combat effectiveness of the new army, one which was immediately on the front line between ideological antagonists, with the perspective of a nuclear war fought in their own country against the brothers of the eastern part of Germany together with the former opponents.³¹⁸ The founders of the West German armed forces tried to create military reforms in the political, social, legal, and historical roles of the professional soldier in German life.³¹⁹

B. THE CONCEPT OF *INNERE FUEHRUNG* AND THE CITIZENS IN UNIFORM MODEL

The Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany³²⁰ were founded on 12 November 1955,³²¹ the 200th birthday of Scharnhorst.³²² They were created from the wreckage of Nazi Germany with the burden of its military and political background and the final decision regarding the future of West Germany within Western Europe.³²³ The concept of *Innere Fuehrung*³²⁴ was provided as the answer from the West German government to the political disaster of the past, the military history and the future civil-military relations of a new army in the

³¹⁷ Abenheim, p. 44.

³¹⁸ The West Germans insisted upon a NATO strategy of allied forward defense of Central Europe to protect the main body of West Germany against an attack from the East and to get the U.S. forces involved as soon as possible.

³¹⁹ Abenheim, p. 6.

³²⁰ The Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany were, from 1956 on, referred to as the *Bundeswehr*.

³²¹ Abenheim, p. 3., the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsaecker, stated in a speech in the Ministry of Defense in Bonn, on 12 November 1985, that the West German Army was “founded on the traditions of the Prussian reformers of the early nineteenth century and of the military resistance to Hitler.”

³²² Scharnhorst, the leader of the Prussian military reform, spoke of “*Buerger in Waffen* (citizen in arms) filled with a liberal spirit”, Abenheim, p. 98.

³²³ With the decision to have their own West German Army, the politicians made a final decision about the integration of the West and the diversion between East and West Germany.

³²⁴ A term that can't be translated directly into English, nevertheless sometimes it is translated as ‘inner leadership’. The official *White Paper 1994*, p. 132, from the German Federal Ministry of Defense, speaks about “Leadership and Civic Education”.

democratic Germany and within a Western alliance. As Donald Abenheim explained, it can be described “as military leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen. ... It is an ongoing attempt to reconcile the citizen with the soldier, and to overcome the traditional antagonism between democracy and the military history.”³²⁵ Under this concept, the German principle³²⁶ of citizen in uniform,³²⁷ in a “democratic people’s army” was developed. This concept supports both military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation in a pluralistic society as well as subordination of the military to civilian control with the acceptance of the primacy of politics.³²⁸ The aims were to integrate the armed forces into the new German democracy, with military order and obedience fixed directly to the rule of law, and “to prevent the revival of the politically and socially exclusivist armed forces of the past.”³²⁹ Therefore the idea was that “the soldier was to be integrated into society and was no longer to feel himself as a warrior exalted above civilians.”³³⁰ The political status of every soldier was to be treated as an equal citizen, as “a free person, a good citizen, and an effective soldier.”³³¹ The German citizen in uniform should participate in the life of the state and experience the daily values, and thus become the guardian of them.³³² The main goals were to foster the integration of the military into the democratic society and to define the inner structure of the armed forces.³³³ The whole concept is laid down in a broad variety of laws,³³⁴ decrees³³⁵ and field manuals. The first

³²⁵ Abenheim, p. 45.

³²⁶ Translation of ‘Principle’ into German is *Leitbild*.

³²⁷ Abenheim, p. 81. *Staatsbuerger in Uniform* became a catch phrase of the reform.

³²⁸ Experienced front fighters saw *Innere Fuehrung* as the roots of the decline of the army, because the concept has limits in the duty of obedience, divides responsibility, and breaks with the tradition of the army, Ilseman von, Carl Gero, Die Innere Fuehrung in den Streitkraefte, Band 5, Die Bundeswehr, Eine Gesamtdarstellung, herausgegeben von Dr. Reinfried Hubert und Walitschek Hubert F., Regensburg: Walhalla u. Praetoria Verlag, 1981, p. 4.

³²⁹ Abenheim, p. 122.

³³⁰ Abenheim, p. 58.

³³¹ Abenheim, p. 128.

³³² Abenheim, p. 158.

³³³ Simon, Ulrich, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, Heidelberg, Hamburg: R. V. Decker’s Verlag, G. Schenk, 1980, p. X.

³³⁴ Basic law (*Grundgesetz*), Law of the ombudsman (*Wehrbeauftragtengesetz*.)

instructions to handle Innere Fuehrung within the Bundeswehr were given by the Federal Ministry of Defense in 1957, with a book called *Handbuch Innere Fuehrung: Hilfen zur Klaerung der Begriffe*.³³⁶ In 1972, the first field manual with the number 10/1 and the name *Hilfen fuer die Innere Fuehrung*³³⁷ gave more detailed examples of how Innere Fuehrung should be practiced on the company level. The current main field manual is the ZDv 10/1, Innere Fuehrung,³³⁸ with an appendix, (Anlage 3/1); it gives reference to 24 additional field manuals which are relevant to the concept of Innere Fuehrung.

Most of the pillars of the military reform of 1955 continue to exist today. Foremost is the parliamentary control of the Bundeswehr,³³⁹ with the establishment of a parliamentary Budget and Defense Committee, the Petitions Committee and the Wehrbeauftragter (Parliamentary Commissioner)³⁴⁰ to oversee the inner structure of the armed forces.³⁴¹ In addition, the soldiers have the right to complain to the Petitions Committee or the Parliamentary Commissioner and the right to refuse military service, choosing instead to perform social service. The soldier has the right to vote and to be a political candidate as well,³⁴² as a German citizen in uniform with “civic duties, in contrast to the exclusivist social and political ethos of the German soldier before 1933.”³⁴³

³³⁵ For example, decree about tradition, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fue S I 3 – Az 35-08-07, (editor), Richtlinien zum Traditionsverstaendnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr, Bonn: 1982.

³³⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (editor), Handbuch Inneren Fuehrung: Hilfen zur Klaerung der Begriffe, Bonn, 1957.

³³⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (editor), Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv) 10/1 – Hilfen fuer die Innere Fuehrung, Bonn, 1972.

³³⁸ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Fue S I 4 (editor), Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv) 10/1 – Innere Fuehrung, Ziffer, 7 und Anlage 3/1, Bonn, 1993.

³³⁹ Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, German Security Policy and the Bundeswehr, Boenen/Westfalen: Druck Verlag Kettler, 1997, p. 25.

³⁴⁰ Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1), zuletzt geaendert durch Gesetz vom 26. Juli 2002 (BGBl. I S. 2863), Wehrbeauftragter des Bundestages, Artikel 45b.

³⁴¹ Abenheim, p. 124.

³⁴² Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1), zuletzt geaendert durch Gesetz vom 26. Juli 2002 (BGBl. I S. 2863), Aktive und Passive Wahlrecht, Artikel 28.

³⁴³ Abenheim, p. 98.

However, the German Basic Law has in Article 17a and 137 (1) a few limitations for soldiers as well.

C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SINCE 1955 AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF *INNERE FUEHRUNG*

Four phases in the West German society's experience with military security affairs can be distinguished:³⁴⁴

- a) The first phase of the cold war, until the mid 1960s, in which the citizen understood the society to be 'defense ready' (*Verteidigungsbereit*).
- b) The second phase until the end of 1980, which could be defined as societal 'willingness of deterrence'.
- c) The upheaval phase, which consisted of the breakdown of the communist system and German reunification, when society developed a 'far away from war' attitude.
- d) The current phase of 'new orientation' in which society accepts peace-keeping for humanitarian reasons under a UN resolution, but not a different form of intervention or even a preemptive strike against a potential aggressor.

The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* is a dynamic one which has to respond to civil society developments to ensure the integration of the military in state and society. During all of these periods, the basic tasks of *Innere Fuehrung* were fulfilled, namely to balance the tensions and achieve a level of consent independent from the government ruling coalition.

Six main developments in the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* which have occurred since 1955 can be described: a) public conflict over *Innere Fuehrung* from 1966 to 1972, b) the military tradition, c) political activity, d) German unification in 1990, e) military missions and f) multinational units.

³⁴⁴ Ebeling, Klaus; Seiffert, Anja; Senger, Rainer, *Ethnische Fundamente der Inneren Fuehrung*, SOWI-Arbeitspapier Nr.: 132, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, Strausberg, Mai 2002.

1. Public Conflict over *Innere Fuehrung* from 1966 to 1972

Tensions over *Innere Fuehrung* have existed since the development of the concept. However, between 1966 and 1972 this tensions developed into an open conflict between the liberal reformers and modernizers and the traditionalists. Developments in the civilian society towards more liberalism and socialism influenced the West German Armed Forces with authority problems.³⁴⁵ The prevailing values of the society and its political, sociological and juridical system would be transferred to the military, because the armed forces are not an isolated institution.³⁴⁶ The political activities of left wing students and the opposition from outside the parliament (*Ausserparlamentarische Opposition APO*) attacked the state and its institutions.³⁴⁷ Civil-military relations deteriorated, because the Federal Armed Forces were considered as one pillar of the state institutions and conscripts were enforced from the civilian society to conscious objection. In order to counter the tendency to weaken the *Bundeswehr* with liberal and socialist ideas, General Schnez wrote a conservative study.³⁴⁸ In response to the traditional views of Schnez and Karst, lieutenants at the officer's course in 1970 wrote a paper with liberal reform proposals. Economic difficulties during the first oil crises left the public afraid to complain in general, and installed a fear of losing the job especially. Under these circumstances the public tensions disappeared over the next years³⁴⁹ and a social-democratic and liberal coalition tried to balance the tensions with a new education concept, like the Federal Armed Forces Universities in Munich and Hamburg. Overall, from 1972 on, the *Bundeswehr* came into a more technocratic phase with a series of regulations and increasing bureaucracy which limited the latitude of decisions.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁵ Thesis of General de Maiziere in Simon, p. 112.

³⁴⁶ Ilsemann, p. 1.

³⁴⁷ Simon, p. 112.

³⁴⁸ Simon, p. 113.

³⁴⁹ Simon, p. 114.

³⁵⁰ Simon, p. 121.

2. Conflict over Military Tradition 1982

During all phases, the *Bundeswehr* continued to make adjustments in the military tradition and the political importance of military symbolism.³⁵¹ Especially, at the end of the policy of détente in 1982,³⁵² during the second phase of the cold war, under the SPD Minister of Defence, Hans Apel, Guidelines for the Understanding of Tradition and the Maintenance of Tradition in the *Bundeswehr*, appeared.³⁵³ One idea in particular reveals an interesting development in thinking about the relationship of military leaders to politics: “Worthy of the maintenance of tradition were, ‘soldiers who went beyond proving themselves as military professionals and participated in political revival and who contributed to the rise of an emancipated citizenry’”.³⁵⁴ For example, the barracks for the German armed forces’ highest education facility in Hamburg were named after Count Baudissin,³⁵⁵ one of the founders of the *Innere Fuehrung* concept.

3. Encouragement for Political Activity 1983

A few changes in the relationship of the military to political activity can be recognized, mostly initiated by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). For example, despite a majority of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers with a conservative tendency, the SPD tried several times to encourage the soldiers to take a more active role in public discussions and political activities on military and security issues. For example, soldiers were encouraged to take

³⁵¹ The abuse of military symbolism during the regime of National Socialism was a heavy burden for the West German Armed Forces, which had lost all positive meaning.

³⁵² With the decision to close the armament gap of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and the deployment decision of Pershing and cruise missiles, the policy of détente under the social-liberal coalition was finished.

³⁵³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), Fue S I 3 – Az 35-08-07, (editor), Richtlinien zum Traditionsverstaendnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeweher (Richtlinien), Bonn, 1982.

³⁵⁴ Abenheim, p. 282, BMVg, Richtlinien zum Traditionsverstaendnis, p. 3, Nr. 16.

³⁵⁵ Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Rede anlaesslich der Umbenennung der „General-Schwartzkopf-Kaserne“ in „Generalleutnant-Graf-v.-Baudissin-Kaserne“ am 07.Juni 1994 in Hamburg-Osdorf, Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Pressestelle, Hamburg, 1994.

part in the security policy debate about intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in 1977-1983 to close the armament gap, during the time of the NATO decision to deploy Pershing medium range rockets and cruise missile in Europe and especially in West Germany. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was looking for support from the professionals of security (i.e., the soldiers) on the deployment decision, one which was very controversial in his own SPD party. This was a time in which the political education (*Politische Bildung*), which was always linked to *Innere Fuehrung*,³⁵⁶ saw a revival in its importance to develop a political educated citizen in uniform, even if the soldiers had different educational levels.³⁵⁷ The strategy of connecting the civilian-society with the *Bundeswehr* through the support of officers responsible for the youth (*Jugendoffizier*) to communicate with the younger population and to inform them about security issues was reinforced. On the other hand, the field-manual (*Zentrale Dienstvorschrift ZDv*) 10/1, of *Innere Fuehrung* from 1993³⁵⁸ in combination with the *Soldatengesetz*³⁵⁹ (Law for the soldiers) paragraph 15, states that any political activity is prohibited in the barracks and that a soldier cannot take part in demonstrations or political activities in uniform. If a soldier does so, he has to do this as a civilian, in civilian clothes. The aim is to keep political rivalry out of the barracks.

4. German Unification 1990

The most challenging situation since the 1960s to civil-military relations and the *Innere Fuehrung* concept was the process of German unification in October 1990. It was a question of whether *Innere Fuehrung* would stand the test

³⁵⁶ Political education, *Politische Bildung*, was called at the beginning, in 1957 as 'Geistige Ruestung' (intellectual *armament*, knowledge), Ilseemann, p. 73.

³⁵⁷ In the east part of Germany, especially in the NVA, political education was recognized as indoctrination and agitation against communism which would prepare the support of an attack, Ilseemann, p. 76.

³⁵⁸ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Fue S I 4 (editor), *Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv) 10/1 – Innere Fuehrung*, Ziffer, 220 und Anlage 2/1, Bonn, 1993. (Field manual 10/1 describes what *Innere Fuehrung* means).

³⁵⁹ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Fue S I 3 (editor), *Soldatengesetz*, Schriftenreihe Innere Fuehrung, Beiheft zur Information fuer die Truppe, Koeln, Berlin, Bonn, Muenchen, 1986.

or fail. The starting conditions were not the best. The *Bundeswehr* was not prepared for such development. The course of action, reunification, was not on the agenda, because it was seen as most unlikely.³⁶⁰ The uncertainty of the situation, equal to that of a battle, and the lack of regulations made an evaluation of the situation necessary and called on of the leadership principle and mission order tactics of the *Bundeswehr*.³⁶¹ However, one thing was confirmed as a result of the 'Two plus Four' negotiations. That was, that the unified Germany would become a NATO member; which, considering the east part of Germany, was the first step in the NATO east enlargement process.³⁶² Tension which arose between the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA) and the population,³⁶³ which saw the NVA as an institution of the regime to suppress the population, gave the members of the NVA an uncomfortable feeling.

One month before, in September 1990, the *Bundeswehr* Chief of Staff wrote that, as the NVA had been, until 9 November 1989, an 'army of the party and the instrument of a dictatorship, ... symbols, uniforms, and tradition of the NVA will not be transferred to the *Bundeswehr*.'³⁶⁴ The new commander of *Bundeswehr Kommando Ost* (BKO - Armed Forces command of East Germany) stated:

The unification came surprisingly, faster than expected and was connected with a take over, of the Communist-indoctrinated armed forces, formerly hostile to us (West Germany) and drilled to hate

³⁶⁰ Scheven von, Werner, *Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost*, in Thoss, Bruno und Schmidt, Wolfgang, Vom Kalten Krieg zur deutschen Einheit, Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichte zur deutschen Militaergeschichte, 1945 bis 1995, Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995, p. 473.

³⁶¹ Scheven, p. 476.

³⁶² Scheven, p. 474.

³⁶³ Schoenbohm, Joerg, Two Armies and one Fatherland. The End of the *Nationale Volksarmee*, Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996, p. 60.

³⁶⁴ Victorson, Mark E., Mission in the East. The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States, Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War Collage, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Newport Papers, no. 7, June 1994, p. 33 and Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv) 10/1 – Innere Fuehrung, Vorbemerkung, (No tradition could be taken from the NVA to the Bundeswehr, because the NVA was an army of the communist party).

and be ready to attack.³⁶⁵ ... These soldiers had to be persuaded to co-operate from the first day.”³⁶⁶

From the beginning it was clear that it would not be a fusion of two armed forces. Instead it was a take over of the Nation's Public Army (*Nationale Volksarmee* – NVA) by the *Bundeswehr*. All NVA units were dismissed over a period of two years or used as a nucleus for new units³⁶⁷ and only a small number of NVA soldiers were allowed to stay in the *Bundeswehr*,³⁶⁸ because the 'Two plus Four Treaty' dictated that the *Bundeswehr* could have only a maximum strength of 370,000 soldiers.³⁶⁹ In October 1990, the NVA had about 103,000 soldiers and the *Bundeswehr* 495,000.³⁷⁰ The tasks of the new BKO were to dismiss most of the soldiers, to disband the units, to remove the wall and frontier defenses, and to completely dismiss the former frontier troops.³⁷¹

The question became: how could the new BKO achieve all of the tasks, under these conditions? The answer was, only if the former NVA members would co-operate! But what could they expect as compensation for their support of the transition phase? They would receive a united fatherland and dismissed servicemen would get a transitional payment,³⁷² an unclear social security, and a

³⁶⁵ Scheven describes the indoctrination about the aggressive Federal Republic of Germany and its NATO partners and the education of hate in the NVA against the West German Armed Forces, p. 486.

³⁶⁶ Schoenbohm, p. viii.

³⁶⁷ Scheven, p. 485.

³⁶⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper, Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1994, p. 16; about 11,000 soldiers were selected for continuing employment as regular or temporary –career volunteers with extended terms of enlistment. The personal suitability of the officers earmarked to become regulars was determined by the independent "Suitability Test Board" in accordance with the provisions of the Unification Treaty.

³⁶⁹ Scheven explains that the details were discussed between the German Chancellor Dr Kohl and the Russian Premier Gorbatschow during their meeting in the Caucasus on July 16th, 1990.

³⁷⁰ Schoenbohm p. 37.

³⁷¹ Schoenbohm, p. 47.

³⁷² Scheven, p. 491, the payment of former NVA soldiers was 60% of the *Bundeswehr* salary.

small chance of education and training for civilian jobs.³⁷³ Of primary concern were the personnel matter and the building of good human relations. *Innere Fuehrung* tried to enforce that the soldiers understood the new comrades and from the beginning the soldiers were treated as individuals with dignity and rights.³⁷⁴

The most important difference between the NVA and the *Bundeswehr* was incorporated in the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* with the relationship of the military to state and society. That is, the link between the free and democratic state, based on the rule of law and NATO as an alliance of sovereign democratic states, was unknown and denied in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Therefore, General Schoenbohm explained:

In the *Bundeswehr* you are serving peace and freedom, and human rights, as laid down in the Basic Law. In the GDR on the other hand, you were serving peace at the price of freedom of the individual. ... That concept of peace, with no link to human rights and our Basic Law, is not enough for the future. ... If you want to stay in the *Bundeswehr*, you must cast off the past of the Socialist armed forces without any ifs and buts!³⁷⁵

One of the main reasons why *Innere Fuehrung* became successful was that the principles were being lived by soldiers who came from the west part of the Federal Republic of Germany, like General Schoenbohm, Commander of the BKO, who dealt with great openness and frankness on all issues of the former NVA.³⁷⁶ The common identity was supported by the very important factor that there were no visible differences between soldiers of the former NVA and the old *Bundeswehr*. From the very beginning the aim was not to insult the dignity and

³⁷³ Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper*, 1994, p. 16, and Schoenbohm, p. 65, over 12,000 former servicemen have gained qualification for a new professional future.

³⁷⁴ Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Law, 1949, Article 1, paragraph 1, "The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public authority." Tschentscher, Axel, *The Basic Law*, (Grundgesetz), The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 23rd, 1949, Wuerzburg: Jurisprudencia Verlag, 2002.

³⁷⁵ Schoenbohm, p. 68.

³⁷⁶ Falkenberg, Thomas, *Civil-Military Relations and its Problems -Germany and Russia-*, Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: 1997, p. 67.

feelings of the soldiers from the former NVA any more than necessary. This desire was rooted in the central principle of *Innere Fuehrung*.³⁷⁷

In conclusion, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* was successful overall, and survived in the unexpected crucial test in another country. Based on the openness and willingness of the members from the old *Bundeswehr* to work together with the old NVA members, and considering the small chances of former NVA members to stay in the new *Bundeswehr*, the success could not be expected.

These developments were viewed carefully by the German neighbors, especially the east European countries which became free after the crash of the Warsaw pact. Their decisions to become democracies are partially based on new civil-military relations and leadership concepts in the armed forces. The German concept has proven to be successful in a transition country and was used in bi-lateral education from the beginning as an example in the new democratic countries of east Europe. Since Partnership for Peace (PfP) was institutionalized, western concepts of civil-military relations have been transferred to these new democracies. The Marshall-Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany is one of the main institutions where developments in civil-military relations are analyzed and explained to the civilian and military elites of these countries.

5. Out-of-area and Peace-keeping Missions 1991

The unification had left open questions regarding Germany's role in the world. "Preoccupied with managing the smooth transition to unification, Bonn suddenly found itself confronted with demands to assume greater international responsibilities in relation with a united Germany's new status."³⁷⁸ Moreover, the German population had a deep-seated aversion to the idea of greater military responsibility. However, Volker Ruehe, the German Minister of Defense during

³⁷⁷ Victorson, p. 29.

³⁷⁸ Kelleher and Fisher, Germany, p. 168.

this time (1992-1998), explained that “German participation in multilateral military actions is part of the process of restoring normality to a united Germany and to grow into greater responsibility.”³⁷⁹

This decision led to the question of out-of-area and peacekeeping missions. In July 1994, the German Constitutional Court decided that there was in fact no constitutional bar to the use of the German armed forces abroad and out of area. Gradually, the German Defense Minister initiated the delicate process of re-acustoming the German public to German military action beyond the territory of NATO.³⁸⁰

Since 1991, soldiers of the German armed forces have taken part in a variety of out-of-area missions.³⁸¹ Using the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* to explain to the service personnel why they had to do military missions and by education and training on the political and legal reasons for military service to appreciate the purpose of the military mission, attitudes were developed which made them more willing to perform their duties conscientiously.³⁸²

6. Multinational Units

An unsolved issue is the role of *Innere Fuehrung* in multinational units. At the same time as the *Innere Fuehrung* concept was developed, the idea of a common European Defense Community (*Europaeische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft – EVG*) was predominant. *Innere Fuehrung* was during this time a very progressive concept, however, designed for a German Armed Forces embedded completely in a greater European Defense Force structure. The EVG idea was stopped in 1954 by the French parliament and the *Bundeswehr* was

³⁷⁹ Kelleher and Fisher, Germany, p. 169.

³⁸⁰ Sarotte, Mary E., German Military Reform and European Security, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, Adelphi Paper 340, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, p 10.

³⁸¹ 1991, Un-Hospital Cambodia, 1992, UNOSOM Somalia; since 1995, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia; 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo; since 1999 KFOR in Kosovo; since 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom in the war against terrorism and ISAF.

³⁸² Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper, 1994, p. 132.

integrated in NATO. Since 1982, with the German-French Brigade, and especially in the 1990s, Germany has intensified the approach to multinational units.³⁸³ All units of the army are engaged in multinational corps. Nevertheless, up to now, in all these integrated units there is no integrated leadership concept. The principles of *Innere Fuehrung* are hardly comparable with the French leadership concept. The inviolable dignity of the citizen and the soldier are guaranteed in the 'Basic Law' (*Grundgesetz*) of Germany, but not in all other states of the multinational units. Different levels of leadership could endanger combat readiness and effectiveness. To first discover this during a combat mission would most likely be too late. Therefore, during peacetime, education and training of the partner-nations of multinational units have to occur, in order to adjust leadership concepts under the mutual aim of military efficiency and the greatest possible democratic rights for soldiers.³⁸⁴

E. GERMAN UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY PROFESSION³⁸⁵

Huntington writes about the German professionalism:

No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other major power was in the end so completely prostituted. ... World War I illustrates the disastrous results when military men assume political rules. Nazi rule illustrates the equally catastrophic results when military warnings are unheeded and political leaders ride roughshod over the soldiers.³⁸⁶

In 1871, the new German Reich inherited from Prussia the most professional officer corps during this time. However, following that, "the

³⁸³ Germany participates on following Corps: EUROCORPS, ARRC, II. German-U.S., V. U.S.-German, I. German-Netherlands, Multinational Corps North-East (German-Danish-Polish), www.deutschesheer.de.

³⁸⁴ Opitz, Eckardt, „Perspektiven fuer die Innere Fuehrung – Anmerkungen zur „Fuehrungsphilosophie“ der Bundeswehr,“ in Hans-Georg Ehrhardt, Militaer und Gesellschaft im Kontext europaeischer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2001, p. 41.

³⁸⁵ Huntington, p. 30

³⁸⁶ Huntington, p. 98.

professional army created by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was destroyed by Hitler.”³⁸⁷

In 1957, Huntington’s description about the future of German civil-military relations was very pessimistic and incorrect. His critique was, that the ‘inner order’³⁸⁸ of the army would be supervised by a commission of civilians³⁸⁹ and that civil education would be done by “a special citizenship course and “would create “an ideologically motivated force embodying subjective rather than objective civilian control. His conclusion was that, “inevitably this will foster the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army.”³⁹⁰ Furthermore, Huntington concluded, that the German concept “was in part an imitation of the American conquerors of Hitler. But the changes of the Bonn government were not for the better.”³⁹¹ This paper will show that the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* was not an imitation of the American concept during and after the Second World War. Moreover, it was a creation of an unique military concept in a democracy, with the citizen in uniform model as the point of main interest, which can be used as a foundation for a common understanding of future military profession in democratic states.

The German military profession is based on history, *Innere Fuehrung* and a second cornerstone, the principle of *Auftragstaktik* (mission oriented command). “*Innere Fuehrung* is today inseparably linked with *Auftragstaktik*. Both were considered at the beginning as a threat to military discipline.”³⁹² Both, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and the principle of *Auftragstaktik* are based on the liberal-democratic ideas of the free democratic constitutional structure and

³⁸⁷ Huntington, p. 123.

³⁸⁸ The translation of *Innere Fuehrung* into English as ‘inner order’ is a mistranslation. On the other side, during the first years of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany the term “*Inneres Gefuege*” (inner structure) was some times used instead of “*Innere Fuehrung*”, and Huntington may have translated this into inner order, which is still not a valid translation.

³⁸⁹ At the Center of *Innere Fuehrung*, a Council with civil members who gives advice for the development of the concept is attached.

³⁹⁰ Huntington, p. 123.

³⁹¹ Huntington, p. 123.

³⁹² Widder, Werner, *Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuehrung*, Trademarks of German Leadership, Military Review, September-October 2002, p. 5.

the basic law which have the common image of a man as a soldier as a free person. His individual dignity is respected just as well as his basic rights and rights of liberty. This respect and liberty harness the soldier to achieve superior strength. "Only the responsible citizen will act out of his own free will and the responsibility he feels toward the community. He recognizes that the values of the community have to be defended even at the risk of his own life."³⁹³ *Auftragstaktik* enables the soldier to achieve professional military success by exploiting the available sophisticated technology in combination with all of the skills of the soldiers to fulfill the order and tasks of the complex challenges of the 21st century. "*Innere Fuehrung* is the commitment of German soldiers to moral-ethical standards and the German Armed Forces corporate culture."³⁹⁴

In October 2000, the commission on *Innere Fuehrung* gave a sub-commission the task to provide an analysis about the common understanding of professional military skills, especially from officers. This sub-commission identified the following elements of the common understanding of professional military skills with spheres of authority and the description of skills and tasks:³⁹⁵

First, the soldier should possess professional qualities, like confidence in his own ability, loyalty, discipline, integrity, honesty, fairness and objectivity, sense of responsibility, intelligence, civic education, physical and psychical resistance, willingness of supreme effort.

Second, he should have social capabilities, like working well with others, fostering teamwork, ability to convince and motivate, tolerance, communication skills (listening, speaking, writing), able to deal with media.

Third, he should exhibit leadership skills and professional qualities, like the ability to set and enforce standards, ability to give mission oriented tasks, to make timely and accurate decisions, emphasizes logic in decision making,

³⁹³ Widder, p. 5.

³⁹⁴ Widder, p. 5

³⁹⁵ Altmeyer, Bischof, Senger, Staudacher, Steger, Thiele, Gemeinsames Berufsverstaendnis, Zentrale Fragestellungen und Handlungsbedarf, Kurzstudie, Unterausschuss Direktorenkonferenz im Aufgabenverbund Innere Fuehrung, Stand: 11.09.2002.

retains composure in stressful situations, recognizes opportunities, sets priorities, information management and a military professional understanding.

Fourth, he should have organization skills, like expert knowledge, ability to plan, coordinate and organize, and use recourses effectively and efficiently.

The main elements of this skill list can be found in the German as well as in the American officer evaluation system.³⁹⁶

The attitudes of the German soldiers toward the military profession have changed since the end of the cold war. The continued threat from the east and the short depth of terrain to defend his own country kept the soldier on constant alert. To guarantee peace was the mission. Sometimes he lived in the area which he was assigned to defend. The transfer for the soldiers was sometimes limited to the same big base or barracks, which gave him the opportunity to achieve higher ranks without moving. This encouraged the integration into the community and society of the base town. Since 1991, when the first UN-mission in Cambodia began, the number of missions outside of the country has increased and the troop strength has been reduced about 40%. In 2002, the *Bundeswehr* had about 10,000 soldiers in six missions.³⁹⁷ The transition of the Armed Forces structure, equipment and education from the capability to defend their own border, to missions out of area is a process which is still ongoing as the new *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* (guidelines for the German defense policy and force structure planning) are showing.³⁹⁸ The orientation towards missions out of the country requires an additional change in image and attitude from the soldiers as military professionals. In 2003, a new discussion about a change in the force structure and troop strength occurred. With this, the question of conscripts appeared again.³⁹⁹ In addition the level of

³⁹⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *ZDv 20/6, Bestimmungen ueber die Beurteilung der Soldaten der Bundeswehr*, and Benton, pp. 103-119.

³⁹⁷ Das Deutsche Heer, *Sachstand und Entwicklung*, Bonn, Januar 2003, p. 12

³⁹⁸ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, Berlin, 21. Mai 2003, pp. 3-22.

³⁹⁹ One of the main statements in the new *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* under number 3 is, that conscription will remain, however, in a changed form one of the pillars in the personnel concept of the *Bundeswehr*.

the soldiers' pension and retirement age came up, with uncertainty for the future planning of the soldiers' families.

The German military profession is based on the concept of *InnereFuehrung*, the principle of *Auftragstaktik* and the model of citizen in uniform (*Staatsbuerger in Uniform*). However, none of the three pillars of the military profession are static, as the current change of political attitude to *Bundeswehr* tasks and missions shows. They are interrelated to developments in the political environment and society.⁴⁰⁰ Their flexibility will guarantee the existence of German military profession in the challenges of the 21st century.

E. SUMMARY: THE AIM AND TASK OF THE *INNERE FUEHRUNG* CONCEPT

The constant change of military warfare to smaller independent units with more technological support requires the self-responsible soldier, who acts and not only reacts to orders. Soldiers are needed who know their duty and are willing to take over responsibility for their own acts under consideration of the task from the higher level of command. Military efficiency can be achieved with the German type of mission order tactics instead of detailed order tactics. As a prerequisite for this type of order, an army needs good education and in addition, soldiers who know for what they are fighting and the conviction of will to take action.⁴⁰¹ The young soldier must be accepted as citizen who is learning the tools of the military. In addition he receives a civic education to learn about the democratic values which he takes for granted. Every superior should set an example in showing his respect of dignity for the young conscripts and give them as much individual freedom as possible from the military point of view without endangering the military task. The possibility for soldiers to use democratic freedom is the best form of teaching, why defending the values of the democracy is a worthy task.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ This is expressed in the *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* from mai 2003 in number 88.

⁴⁰¹ Simon, p. 35.

⁴⁰² Simon, p. 36.

In conclusion, the aim of the *Innere Fuehrung* concept is to achieve a citizen in uniform who is able to combine all three functions in one person: to be a professional soldier, a good citizen and a free person.⁴⁰³ This brings about tensions between the duties as a soldier and the rights as a citizen and behavior as a free person. One of the most important tasks of the *Innere Fuehrung* concept is to balance these tensions which are necessary for military efficiency.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ ZDv 10/1, Innere Fuehrung, Nr. 203.

⁴⁰⁴ Ilseman, p. 9.

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V. COMPARISON OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY PROFESSION PRINCIPLES WITH THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN APPROACHES

Civil-military relations in a democracy signify a special application of representative democracy, with the unique situation that designated political agents control designated military agents. This requires the acceptance of civilian supremacy and control of the military, as well as mutual respect as the core principle of civil-military relations.⁴⁰⁵

As described in Chapter II, there are three main principles of civil-military relations:

1. Democratic civilian control of the military, based on the constitution and the rule of law;
2. Civil-military cooperation over security issues during the decision-making process and civilian supremacy in final decisions;
3. Integration of the military and its soldiers into state and society, including democratic rights for soldiers.

The question is, do the American approach and the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* satisfy the main principles of civil-military relations and can they therefore be used as a foundation for civil-military relations in democratic states? This question becomes especially significant, when considering the current process of NATO enlargement. The integration of the new democratic states in eastern Europe, after a short and sometimes stormy period of transition from communism to democracy, into NATO and its multinational structure, must be built on stable and balanced civil-military relations. The difficult transformation process in the eastern part of Germany, from an isolated military entity, the NVA to individual members in the *Bundeswehr*, as citizens in uniform,⁴⁰⁶ can be seen

⁴⁰⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth P., "Infusing Civil-Military Relations Norms in the Officer Corps," in Matthews, Lloyd J. (editor), The Future of the Army Profession, United States Military Academy, The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2002, p. 245.

⁴⁰⁶ Scheven, pp. 486-503.

as a successful example of civil-military relations development, as explained in Chapter IV.

This chapter compares the American approach and the German concept as to how they met the three main principles of civil-military relations. The aim is to conclude where the advantages and disadvantages of both are and give recommendations for the development of the civil-military relations in the new democratic countries.

A. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW

During the state building phase in the Federal Republic of Germany, between 1948 and 1955, after the painful experience during the Weimar Republic and Third Reich, the topic of democratic civilian control was one of the most important. The Weimar problems were first, the lack of civilian-control over the army. This, for example led to secret military foreign affairs policy with Russia, to bypass the Versailles Peace Treaty and its limitations of weapons, and a secret military budget to finance illegal weapon programs and units.⁴⁰⁷ Secondly, as a non democratic political foundation, the Weimar constitution had a number of emergency laws, like the famous Art. 48.⁴⁰⁸ This gave the President the power to transfer the emergency rights to the *Reichschancellor* to govern without a majority in the parliament. “On February 4, 1933, President von Hindenburg allowed the new chancellor (Hitler) to use presidential emergency powers to decree a law restricting freedom of the press and assembly.”⁴⁰⁹ Thirdly, the involvement of career officers, like Kurt von Schleicher, in the highest level of policy without an election, but supported by the powerful institution of the

⁴⁰⁷ Craig, pp. 423-426.

⁴⁰⁸ Falkenberg, p. 47.

⁴⁰⁹ Turner, Henry Ashby, jr, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, p. 163.

army,⁴¹⁰ who allowed that the army and its military professional officer corps became an object of the nationalistic demagogy.⁴¹¹

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the basic law (*Grundgesetz*) describes the political control and tasks of the German armed forces.⁴¹² The purpose of the *Bundeswehr* is primarily to defend the country, with very limited internal tasks in cases of emergency. Responsibility for the control of the military resides in the Parliament, the *German Bundestag* and its subdivisions - the Defense- and Budget-Committee, the Parliamentary Commissioner of the armed forces and the Petitions Committee.⁴¹³ The Defense Committee has to review all questions concerning defense policy – from soldiers' pay and the procurement of weapon systems to political decisions of the Federal Government in the area of defense and security policy. The committee can convene meetings at any time. The Budget Committee has to review and authorize the Federal Budget. Its decisions must then be approved by the *Bundestag* in plenary session. The Basic Law prescribes that the strength, organization and armament of the *Bundeswehr* be listed in detail in the federal budget. The Parliamentary Commissioner of the *Bundeswehr* has to observe the guaranteed protection of the soldiers' civil rights and principles of *Innere Fuehrung*.⁴¹⁴ The Commissioner is answerable only to the Bundestag, and every soldier can refer any military matters directly to the Commissioner, without fear of any disadvantage. A superior who doesn't honor this is in breach of the law. The Commissioner has the right to investigate all violations against the rule of law and the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*. He may visit any unit without previous notice and can request

⁴¹⁰ Turner, p. 167.

⁴¹¹ It was at first the *National Volkspartei* and not Hitler's National Socialist Party which got attention from the military. The lack of a powerful party in the political center gave only the choice for one of the extremist parties. The left wing parties were no alternative for the conservative officer corps, therefore, the tendency moved to the right spectrum of the parties.

⁴¹² Grundgesetz (Basic Law / Constitution) fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1), zuletzt geaendert durch Gesetz vom 26. Juli 2002 (BGBl. I S. 2863), Art. 35 and 87a

⁴¹³ Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, p. 25.

⁴¹⁴ Gesetz ueber den Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages (Gesetz zu Artikel 45b des Grundgesetzes - WBeautrG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 16. Juni 1982 (BGBl. I S. 677) zuletzt geaendert durch Artikel 16 BwNeuAurG vom 20. Dezember 2001 (BGBl. I S. 4013).

all files and additional assistance. An annual report given to the Bundestag⁴¹⁵ gives information about the conditions of the *Bundeswehr*. This report is available to the general public and gets great attention from the media. The Petitions Committee⁴¹⁶ has to protect the guaranteed civil rights. Whenever a soldier feels that his rights have been infringed upon, he may, in addition to the intra-service remedies available to him, take his case directly to the Petitions Committee of the Parliament.

In the United States, the Constitution provides the framework for civilian control of the Armed forces. The power is subdivided into the three branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branch. "Although the executive branch plays the predominant role in maintaining civilian control, the legislative branch has a strong influence in military affairs, reflecting the principle of separation of power."⁴¹⁷ The principle of dual political control was seen first in Great Britain in the 1689 settlement between the crown and parliament that involved the army.⁴¹⁸ "The army was subordinated to a form of dual control, where one authority could act as a check on the other."⁴¹⁹ In the United States, the legislative branch is named in the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, with the following rights: "The Congress shall have power to ... provide for the common defense ... of the United States." A list of specific powers follows, "to declare war, ... to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years," and "to make rules for the government and regulations of the land and naval forces."⁴²⁰

The rights of the Congress were strengthened after the Vietnam War in 1973 with the War Power Act. If the Congress did not declare war and didn't approve the military intervention ordered by the executive branch after 60 days, the President would have to withdraw the troops. In daily work, the power of

⁴¹⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, Jahresbericht 2002 (44. Bericht), Drucksache 15/500, 11.03.2003.

⁴¹⁶ Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1), zuletzt geaendert durch Gesetz vom 26. Juli 2002 (BGBl. I S. 2863), Petitionsrecht, Artikel 17.

⁴¹⁷ Trask, p. 10.

⁴¹⁸ Strachan, p. 11.

⁴¹⁹ Strachan, p. 44.

⁴²⁰ Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Kohn, 1991, p. 22.

Congress is in the right to fund the military appropriately, to ratify or deny treaties, and confirm appointments.

On the other side of the dual control, the President, as the head of the executive branch was given the position of the Commander in Chief in the Constitution, Article II, and Section 2: “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”⁴²¹ The executive branch plays the predominant role in maintaining civilian control, not only against military subversion, moreover in planning military strategies which have to support the national political goal established by the civilian government.⁴²² The professional military heads of the services are subordinated to civilian department heads, which are appointed by the President and confirmed by the congress. In conclusion, the civilian executive branch stands at the head of the military chain of command, supported by civilian subordinates who oversee the day-to-day activities of the armed forces. In practice, the President of the United States appoints the civilian Secretary of Defense, who presides over the Department of Defense, which incorporates the four military services with an undersecretary in each service. The line of operational command flows from the Commander in Chief, in war time, to the Secretary of Defense in peace time, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), directly to the specified and unified commanders.

About the Constitution and the judicial oversight of the military, Trask writes:

The Constitution did not mention judicial oversight of the military, but by 1803, the courts successfully claimed the power of judicial review –including the authority to decide the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. Judicial review led to important decisions that upheld the civil liberties of the American people – including members of the armed services – both in peacetime and wartime.⁴²³

⁴²¹ Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Kohn 1991, p. 25.

⁴²² Trask, p. 9.

⁴²³ Trask, p. 12.

This leads to the practice, that “the judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including those of the members of the armed services.⁴²⁴ “In the United States, the Supreme Court is empowered to hear cases that involve military infringements on the rights of the citizenry.”⁴²⁵

B. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OVER SECURITY ISSUES DURING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN FINAL DECISIONS

In Germany, the Federal Minister of Defense is the peace-time Commander in Chief and the Federal Chancellor is able to exercise the power of command over the armed forces in a state of defense.⁴²⁶ Both are answerable to the Bundestag over all security and defense issues. The *Bundeswehr* Chief of Staff (*Generalinspekteur*) is the advisor to the Minister of Defense in all security issues. The decision-making process in the German Armed Forces is based on the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*. It demands that the soldiers do not just follow unrestricted obedience, but rather that their recommendations and suggestions are used in the policy decision-making process. If the order is against the Basic Law, or any other law, or against dignity and humanity, the soldier is not allowed to execute the order.

In the United States, the National Security Act of 1947 and its Amendments of 1949 established the Department of Defense (DOD) with its three sub-departments of the Army, the Navy,⁴²⁷ and the Air Force with the Joint

⁴²⁴ As a consequence, a code of law to govern the conduct of the military personnel was developed in 1951. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) “civilized and liberalized the military’s criminal laws and procedures, and extended certain rights of citizenship to service personnel.” Major revision occurred in 1968 with the passage of the Military Justice Act and most recently in 1983.

⁴²⁵ Trask, p. 5.

⁴²⁶ Tschentscher, Axel, *The Basic Law, (Grundgesetz)*, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 23rd, 1949, Wuerzburg, Jurisprudencia Verlag, 2002, Art. 65a and 115b, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, p. 25.

⁴²⁷ The Marine Corps is a part of the Navy Department as result of the fear of the Navy, “that unification of the services would come at the Navy’s expense ... in scrapping the Marine Corps in favor of the Army or curtailing naval aviation in favor of an new independent air force” and its Secretary of the Navy Forrestal intervention against this considerations, who drafted a plan in 1943, which kept the Marine Corps included in the body of the Navy. Hogan, p. 32.

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in order to unify the armed forces under a single department.⁴²⁸ The Secretary of Defense is appointed by the President, with consent of the Senate. “As the principal assistant to the president for military matters, the secretary has the authority to exercise direction and control over all elements of the DOD.”⁴²⁹ This includes the JCS, whose Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC) and himself. “The JCS prepares strategic plans and provides strategic direction of the armed forces.”⁴³⁰ The members of the JCS consist of the Chairman, Chief of Staff Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The JCS is responsible for the strategic and tactical planning. The three military departments have responsibility for training, administrative, and logistic support of the unified and specified commands.

The Armed Forces Policy Council, as the most important policy advisory board, works directly under the Secretary of Defense. This civil-military mixed council takes all matters on the highest national security and defense level which need attention under consideration. The council consists of the Secretary of Defense and his deputy, the secretaries of the three departments, the Undersecretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Officials of the DOD, civilian or military, and members of other departments and agencies in the executive branch, may be invited to attend appropriate meetings of the council to support the decision making process.⁴³¹ The final word of authority in the decision and command is in the hands of civilians, the Secretary of Defense and the President as Commander in Chief. However, their power is not unlimited; it is

⁴²⁸ Hogan, p. 31. In 1943, General of the army, George C. Marshall had suggested a plan for a War Department which should unify the armed forces under a single department.

⁴²⁹ National Security Act of 1947 and its Amendment of 1949, Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, as amended through December 31, 1994, by 104th Congress, 1st Session, Chapter 2-Department of Defense, Paragraph 111. Executive Department and 113. Secretary of Defense, quoted after Benton, p. 53.

⁴³⁰ Benton, p. 55.

⁴³¹ Benton, p. 55.

controlled by the checks-and-balances system of the legislative and judicial branch.⁴³²

C. INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY AND ITS SOLDIERS INTO STATE AND SOCIETY

German soldiers do not have the privileges of the American soldiers, like tax free shopping in the Commissary and the PX, military housing areas or any military discounts which are often provided by American merchants. On the other hand, they have the right to take part in all elections and can also be candidates for a political party at any function.⁴³³ Furthermore, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and the *citizen in uniform* model encourage the soldiers to be politically active.⁴³⁴ The great number of bases located all over Germany and conscription integrate the soldiers and their families into society. Noncommissioned officers are especially able to get involved in the social activities of their home towns, because they are able to remain stationed in one place much longer than officers. Many soldiers try to become members of the town councils, which strengthens the integration of the military into state and society at the community level.⁴³⁵ However, it is possible for officers to serve in the highest political roles, such as parliamentarian or as minister, an example of the former is the Commander of the *Bundeswehr Kommando Ost (BKO)*, General Schoenbohm.⁴³⁶

In comparison to the German Armed Forces, the American service members have many more privileges and additional benefits not enjoyed by civilians,⁴³⁷ which are guaranteed by federal law.⁴³⁸ The advice of the Officer

⁴³² Benton, p. 53.

⁴³³ Grundgesetz, Aktive und Passive Wahlrecht, Artikel 28.

⁴³⁴ ZDv 10/1, *Innere Fuehrung*, Ziele und Grundsätze, Kapitel 2, Ziff. 203, 219.

⁴³⁵ To achieve a public office, the *Bundeswehr* ensures that elected members will stay in the area to accomplish their public tasks.

⁴³⁶ He is deputy prime minister of Brandenburg and minister of interior.

⁴³⁷ See Chapter III. D. 2. Rights, Privileges and Restrictions.

Guide is to create a good impression on the civil neighborhood. It is helpful that soldiers and their families become members of the institutions of the civilian community and participate in the civic activities. In summary, the advice is to be a good neighbor. Their military profession does not exclude the service members completely from politics. Trask describes the political involvement as follow:

Officers and enlisted personnel are encouraged to vote. They may contribute money to political parties or directly to a candidate. However, active –duty military personnel may not run for office or be involved in the campaigns of others running for office.⁴³⁹

In the United States, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution⁴⁴⁰ requires the separation of power and makes therefore legislative office incompatible with judicial or executive, including military office. This means that if an active-duty officer or enlisted personnel wants to achieve a political career, he has to first give up his career in the military. However, after retirement, no law prevents military personnel from running for office, participating in the political campaign of others, or holding a political office. The current Secretary of State, Collin Powell, was a former JCS.

When comparing the German rights of political participation with the Americans' lack of participation, the conclusion must be that a German military member has many more rights of participation in politics. The overall emphasis to integrate the military in the civilian society is much more encouraged in Germany.

In conclusion:

The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* harmonizes the principle of freedom held by a democratic constitutional state and the principle of order and function that armed forces must observe to accomplish the mission assigned to them under the constitution. The principles and fundamentals combine the demands of the military mission and duty with the dignity and rights of the citizen. They are designed to balance the tensions that arise from the military obligations of a

⁴³⁸ However, Post Exchange (PX) and commissary are remnants from the time of isolated forts in the west, far away from the civilization, to support the troops and their families with common goods.

⁴³⁹ Trask, p. 29.

⁴⁴⁰ Kohn, 1991, p. 21.

member of the armed forces and the rights and liberties of a citizen. ... The model of *citizen in uniform* stands for the citizen who is prepared to defend his country as a willing member of the armed forces and who assumes responsibility for the freedom and human dignity of others. He is a politically educated and responsible citizen who recognizes and is a firm advocate of the political cause, conditions and consequences of the military action he takes.⁴⁴¹

The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* meets all three necessary conditions of civil-military relations principles and can therefore be taken as a foundation of the civil-military relations concept in democratic constitutional states.

The American approach meets the first and second criteria of civil-military relations very well. With the institution of the Armed Forces Policy Council, the United States has a civil-military policy decision making board with the function of giving advice to the highest level of the nation, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. This ensures that coordinated advice from the military is given to the civilians who are responsible for decision making. Criteria three, the integration of the military and its soldiers in state and society, could be better met if the military members would have more rights in political participation. However, in the tradition of the U.S. military, soldiers on active-duty remain political neutral as part of their understanding of military professionalism.

D. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY PROFESSION

Abenheim, quoting Craig, describes the following difference between the American and German approach to war:

The American approach to war is focused on combat, removed from its political dimension, and on machines in battle that are supposed somehow to supplant the human element of war or to make it unnecessary; the tradition of the German soldier emphasized the role of men in battle and traditions of command and obedience and good judgment handed down from each

⁴⁴¹ Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper, 1994, p. 132.

generation of German officers to their successors and transmitted by them to the units they commanded.⁴⁴²

This statement points out differences between the American and the German approach to two issues. The first difference is in the political dimension, which is removed in the American approach and still remains in the German military. The second difference is in the role of self judgment and the role of men in battle, which is emphasized in the German system in comparison to the emphasis on technology in the American.

These differences can be explained by history and tradition. Both military systems try to achieve superiority over an outnumbered enemy, each with his own strengths and capabilities. Germany is historically short in natural resources but has an advantage in soft power like education, culture and methodology.⁴⁴³ America historically was short in manpower and lacked a willingness to sacrifice their people and cohesion of its population, a disadvantage which disappeared over time with the second and third generation of immigrants.

The German approach to professionalism was to create a sense of fighting spirit in combination with the corps de esprit. To be successful against a superior enemy, efficiency in battle is necessary. This could be achieved through “inner cohesion” or “inner structure”⁴⁴⁴ of the army. “That is the union of moral, social, and political factors in the ranks and in the different institutions of an army that holds together in war.”⁴⁴⁵ Therefore, Fredrick the Great offered the German soldier the “sense of individual and regimental honor that inspired fortitude under fire and made retreat unthinkable.”⁴⁴⁶ From Scharnhorst, the Prussian and later German army took “the concept of discipline, not as robot-like obedience, but as willing subordination to the common interests of the fighting unit to which one

⁴⁴² Abenheim, p. 18 and Rosinski, Herbert, Craig, Gordon A. introduction to, The German Army, New York, 1966, p. 7.

⁴⁴³ Nye, Joseph S. Jr., The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's only Superpower can't go it alone, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 129.

⁴⁴⁴ Craig, introduction to Rosinski, German Army, p. 7.

⁴⁴⁵ Abenheim, p. 17.

⁴⁴⁶ Abenheim, p. 17.

belonged.”⁴⁴⁷ Helmuth von Moltke, in his concept of strategy and operations in war, demonstrated that “adherence to a battle plan must not be allowed to crush the initiative of individual commanders and that the *Feldherr* must have the courage and the wit to change his dispositions as the situation required.”⁴⁴⁸

The aim of a long education, training and experience is that officers cultivate an independent judgment over their subordinates, that they are able to make difficult decisions on their own, as the situation dictates. This provides mutual trust and motivation.⁴⁴⁹ A leader’s character and this ability to establish a basis of trust with his men is decisive. A soldier must have the right to respond to an order with a counter suggestion, if he believes that the order should be carried out differently. This tradition has generally applied to German general staff officers, but it affects the working of the army at all levels.⁴⁵⁰ As Clausewitz explained, a balance between courage and intelligence allows the officer to master the friction of the combat,⁴⁵¹ because decisions must be made at all levels of the military. This calls for responsibility of the leader for his subordinates and creates a camaraderie that provides strength in adversity.

Today, what is even more important than in Clausewitz’s time, is the concept of officers’ education. This has been enlarged over the last few decades to include the education of all soldiers (not just officers), so that they achieve independent judgment and can initiate actions in war and on other missions. The uncertainty and frictions of war require a military character which exhibits initiative after an independent professional judgment.⁴⁵²

The soldier’s code (*Pflichtenlehre*) of the Emperor Wilhelm’s Germany and the Articles of War⁴⁵³ “emphasized loyalty, comradeship, readiness for battle,

⁴⁴⁷ Abenheim, pp. 17 and 18.

⁴⁴⁸ Abenheim, p. 18.

⁴⁴⁹ Simon, pp. 159-164.

⁴⁵⁰ Abenheim, pp. 18 and 19.

⁴⁵¹ Howard, p. 102, “if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect ...and second, the courage.”

⁴⁵² Howard, pp. 101 and 119-121.

⁴⁵³ In the traditional Articles of War it was laid down, “that soldier swears their oath to the king and the regimental flag and that officer instruct their men about their duties to the crown.” Abenheim, p. 24. A very important task for the soldier was to learn the history of the Reich, seen

bravery, and courage, but it also described how a soldier could make a complaint.”⁴⁵⁴

When comparing these principles with the current Officer’s Guide of the United States Services, for example the code of Air Force Service⁴⁵⁵, the similarities in character traits such as patriotism, courage, loyalty, discipline, readiness, sense of responsibility, and teamwork are obvious.

Since 1948, when the development of the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* in Germany first began, there have been discussions over the basics of the concept and ideal type of soldier. From the theoretical point of view, there are two different types of ideas. On one side, there is the classic type of soldier, who is only a fighter, a homogenous warrior, and a complete military professional. On the other side, is the new idea of the soldier as a citizen in uniform in a pluralistic society and heterogeneous armed forces. To explain the difference between both ideal soldier types short term, the members supporting the former fighter type are called “traditionalists”, the later as “reformers”. These expressions seem to be not very fair, because the connection of reform is mostly positive and in connection with progress, while tradition is often associated with something being outdated and old. Nevertheless, it summarizes the difference. However, there are a lot of different intermediate variations between both extremes and the difference is not so black and white.⁴⁵⁶

In the same way as Charles Moskos⁴⁵⁷ explains the movement of the civil-military relations between the convergence and divergence forces, there is a constant struggle of the military profession between the traditionalist and the reformers. Moskos favored a ‘plural’ military over a homogeneous military. Huntington, on the other hand, favored more the traditional idea of the military

as a history of the fatherland, as “a subject that highlighted the heroic role of the army in the unification of Germany. It depicted opponents of the Prussian-dominated order – left-liberals, “Catholic-particularists, and social democrats – in an unflattering light.” Abenheim, p. 25. Behind this stood the threat from left, especially the socialists, that the crown and republic, would be swept away in another revolution, like in 1848. The aim was a military education, for in the case of a civil war, the soldiers would be willing to shoot upon their own brothers.

⁴⁵⁴ Abenheim, p. 25.

⁴⁵⁵ Benton, pp. 8 – 11.

⁴⁵⁶ Simon, p. 28.

⁴⁵⁷ Moskos, p. 272.

profession. In the struggle over the German concept of civil-military relations and the idea of the professional soldier, Count von Baudessin was more successful, with his reform concept of *Innere Fuehrung*, than the traditionalists, like General Karst.⁴⁵⁸

In conclusion, the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* is a reform concept, which is oriented to the pluralistic society and heterogeneous composition of the armed forces. The American approach is still oriented more on Huntington's idea of the truly professional soldier. A comparison of the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* to the American concept shows that the German concept provides additional democratic and liberty rights to the soldiers, which can therefore more enjoy their freedom and rights as citizens. However, the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* balances the necessary limitation in freedom and liberty⁴⁵⁹ needed to achieve military efficiency with the idea of providing as much freedom as possible. To sustain these tensions is the daily practical challenge.

Innere Fuehrung requires the respect of the soldier as a free person. The soldier is self responsible as a free individual, bound to his conscience, values and norms as a military professional.⁴⁶⁰ On the other side, *Innere Fuehrung* calls for the mind, character and conviction in the sense of traditional military values.

Although, the current military profession is facing a number of new dilemmas in postmodern warfare:

1. Rapid changes in technology and weapon systems and political change
(this is not new however, this trend became more intense)
2. Asymmetric warfare

⁴⁵⁸ Simon, p. 31, even the traditionalists were not against the concept of *Innere Fuehrung*, however, they tried to give the concept a different interpretation and approach to the military profession.

⁴⁵⁹ The basic law (*Grundgesetz*) Article 17a allows the limitation of the basic rights during the time of active duty, this limitations are specified in the soldier law (*Soldatengesetz*) and gives limitation to the freedom and liberty, for example, Paragraph 11, obedience, if the order is not violating the human dignity or will imply a crime, Paragraph 18, the duty to live in barracks if he receives this order.

⁴⁶⁰ Simon, p. 33.

3. Crucial decisions to support national interests or even the survival of the nation have to be made. Decisions today have an impact on the future, which cannot be rapidly changed.

4. The use of force in international relations has been so altered that consequences for the military profession system are necessary. For example, the use of minimum forces rather than total victory and the protection of military tasks in peace operations.

5. The new continuing threats of terrorism eliminate the distinction between peacetime and wartime establishments and challenge the military professionals and their families to always be operational ready.

To meet the dilemmas, the requirements for a professional military must be reconsidered and redefined, with a new set of concepts. The unique characteristics of the military profession which have to be reconsidered, are military authority, education and skills, recruitment and social heritage, and political attitude.⁴⁶¹

The first challenge is the problem of military authority. Each military must find its own authority “equilibrium” between domination and liberalism, one which is able to permit initiative and creativity within a hierarchical command structure.⁴⁶²

In Germany, the second cornerstone of *Innere Fuehrung* is the mission-oriented command (*Auftragstaktik*). It is the paramount command and control principle and “is based on mutual trust and requires each soldier’s unwavering commitment to perform his duty.”⁴⁶³ The idea is that the military leader informs what his intention is, sets clear achievable objectives, and provides the required forces and resources. He will only order details regarding execution if measures which serve the same objective have to be harmonized, if political or military constraints require it. He gives latitude to subordinate leaders in the execution of

⁴⁶¹ Janowitz, p. 422.

⁴⁶² Janowitz, p. 423.

⁴⁶³ Heeresdienstvorschrift (HDv) 100/100, Fuehrung im Gefecht, Bonn, 15. Oktober 1998, Nr. 302.

the mission.⁴⁶⁴ To execute the order is the soldier's responsibility. "His skills, creativity, and commitment will be the key elements of the execution. Thus, *Auftragstaktik* is not merely a technique of issuing orders but a type of leadership that is inextricably linked to a certain image of men as soldiers."⁴⁶⁵

The United States' military authority is based on military professional with its own values, morale and military duties. The team spirit requires conducting the order as well as possible. When ever possible, the executions of orders are pre-planned and prepared under the aspect of prevention of casualties.

Both the U.S. and Germany's concepts of military authority are linked to leadership, with emphasis on who gives the orders. "Leadership requires competence, strength of character, trust, initiative, judgment, assertiveness, and decision-making ability at all command levels."⁴⁶⁶

The second challenge is the education and skill for the military professionals, in a broad variety of tasks, from combat to police operations. The professional soldier must develop more and more civilian skills that go far beyond those traditionally required in the military, like those required for police men, administrators and local politicians. Therefore, the military has to develop a proper balance between combat skills and civilian skills for military managers of civilian tasks. This calls for an improved quality of military education training for the different purposes. The tensions between the heroic leader and the military manager must be balanced. Combat operations, like the war against Iraq in April 2003, could change in days or even hours to political-military tasks. This requires an extensive general competence and decision-making capability from the military to switch from combat to constabulary tasks.

The third challenge is found in the recruitment and social heritage of the soldiers. The aim is to achieve greater heterogeneity through a broadened recruitment, which provides social representation from all classes in the military.

⁴⁶⁴ HDv 100/100, Nr. 302.

⁴⁶⁵ Widder, Werner, *Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuehrung*, Trademarks of German Leadership, Military Review, September-October 2002, p. 6, this article is adapted from an address Major General Widder gave to Command and General Staff Officer Course Class (CGSOC) 2002 on 3 April 2002 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁴⁶⁶ Widder, p. 9.

The American armed forces are relying heavily on enlisted personnel as a source of officer personnel, the German armed forces on their conscripts.⁴⁶⁷ Missing are the sons of the upper class. This is compensated by the number of self-recruitment, especially the sons of the NCOs' which become officer candidates. The selection of persons with social backgrounds from military families or rural areas has a tendency to keep a conservative attitude in the military, which is enforced by a military education, discipline, and military lifestyle.

This leads to the fourth and last characteristic of the military profession, the political attitude. A prerequisite to developing one's own political viewpoint is a basic political education and a continuous information supply about political matters. Political basic education should provide the democratic regulations, the institutions of the republic, and the system of international affairs. Higher military education, with a background in military experience, has to connect the political knowledge with the topics more relevant to the military, national security, and international relations. In the upper military jobs of senior officers, there is encouragement from the military profession to become more interested in the relationship between political objectives and military means related to his job. The professional officer must be able to judge alternative political goals and give military advice to politicians.

Under the changes of the postmodern military and considering the unique characteristics of a military professional, the question is: how can the aim, to guarantee military effectiveness in a "postmodern" war be achieved, with the prerequisite, to give the soldier as many citizen rights as possible?

To achieve this aim, the superior must be a team-leader of specialists. Fighting in small independent specialized units requires a self-responsible soldier who is able to make the decisions on his level, on his own. This is something different from absolute authority. Since the speed of operations has increased tremendously with the new capabilities of technology, decisions now have to be made faster and at all levels.

⁴⁶⁷ About 25% of the officers have been conscripts before they became officer candidates.

The American answer is to provide the state of the art in equipment and the best training for their professional soldiers, which have enough experience⁴⁶⁸ to conduct joint actions against all kinds of enemies and threatening environments. As the Secretary of the Navy, Hansford T. Johnson explained recently, the U.S. Armed Forces are in a constant transformation, more than ever before, because the technology is changing so rapidly. The aim is to be ahead compared to other Armed Forces, not only in numbers of troops, but also in technological advancements in the equipment. Based on the developments of science and research, equipment is provided from the national defense industry, which will be used with joint understanding and training of the soldiers in combined and joint operations, who are supported by the very important pillar of the armed forces, the reserve.⁴⁶⁹

The German answer is a soldier, one who is well educated by the mission oriented command (*Auftragstaktik*) and able to adapt to changing situations. In 1998, *Auftragstaktik* was codified in the German Army Regulation (AR) 100/100 (restricted), *Command and Control in Battle*, as the pre-eminent command and control principle in the army of the German armed forces.⁴⁷⁰ General Widder describes both, *Innere Fuehrung* and *Auftragstaktik* as “trademarks of German leadership.”⁴⁷¹

Not every country has the identical idea of a professional soldier. The history, political culture, national interest and resulting military tasks are the reasons for the differences. “In a pluralistic society, the future of the military profession is not a military responsibility exclusively, but rests on the vitality of civilian political leadership.”⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁸ Experience from other battlefields or Combat Maneuver Training Centers

⁴⁶⁹ The Secretary of the Navy, gave a speech during the Superintendent Guest Lecture, at the Naval Postgraduate School, on May 16th, 2003.

⁴⁷⁰ HDv 100/100, Nr. 302. This is the basic field manual in the German Army.

⁴⁷¹ Widder, p. 3.

⁴⁷² Janowitz, p. 435.

VI. CHANGED ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 'POSTMODERN MILITARY' AND ITS EFFECTS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

A. THE EFFECTS OF HISTORY, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPEMENTS ON THE 'POSTMODERN MILITARY'

Since the end of the cold war, armed forces have been called "postmodern military."⁴⁷³ They are operating in the following context:⁴⁷⁴

1. The weight of history: The inheritances from the past are the political, military culture and ethos, organizational structure, equipment, doctrine and research developments.
2. Domestic context: Political, economic, and socio-cultural constraints influence force structure and ethos.
3. International environment: Armed Forces shift their concern from aggression to more indeterminate threats. New security risks require a broad variety of military responses and a change in perception, from a single constant threat to complex risks with asymmetric challenges. This requires new concepts of national security, including preventive wars and preemptive strikes, and brings with it the whole question of legitimacy.

These contexts have influences on the postmodern military which must be considered, when making following major organizational changes:⁴⁷⁵

1. The trend of mergence between the civilian and military spheres has increased;
2. The change in military purpose, from fighting wars to conducting missions, which have not traditionally been considered;

⁴⁷³ Moskos, Charles C., Willians, John A., Segal, David R., "Armed Forces after the cold war", in The Postmodern Military, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 2.

⁴⁷⁴ Dandeker, Christopher, "The Military in Democratic Societies: New Times and New Patterns of Civil-military Relations", in Kuhlmann, Juergen and Callaghan, Jean (editors), Military and Society in 21st Century Europe. A Comparative Analysis, Muenster, Hamburg, London: Transaction Publishers, 2000, pp. 27-28.

⁴⁷⁵ Moskos, Willians, Segal, p. 275.

3. The internationalization of military forces themselves. Members of the armed forces of various nations will work increasingly with each other, side-by-side, in combined operations or as part of a greater military unit.
4. The extensive use of multinational military forces authorized or legitimated by intergovernmental or supranational institutions.

These developments have effects on two dimensions of civil-military relations, first, between the military and the wider society, and second, between the military and the government.

B. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE 'POSTMODERN MILITARY' ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Several changes in the organizational structure of the postmodern military are effecting the civil-military relations.

First, between the military and the wider society; an increased trend⁴⁷⁶ of "tensions between the civilian values of a democratic society and the unique structure and culture of the military must be expected."⁴⁷⁷ Therefore, to meet these challenges, the postmodern military has to create a new military ethos which fulfils the demands of contemporary social values, operational and combat effectiveness, modern business effectiveness, and media and public support.

As second change, between the military and the government, namely an increasing merger of the civilian and military spheres, must be expected. Therefore, the formulation and implementation of security policy and the erosion of the boundary between political and military decisions, calls for a politically educated officer corps. In an extension of Janowitz's pragmatic constabulary

⁴⁷⁶ The tensions of values between the civilian society and the military were considered even before 1990. Guenter Wachtler explained in 1983, that the military is a integrated component of the developments in the society and the process of change. Military, policy, economy, state and society are in close connection to each other. Wachtler, Guenter, Militaer, Krieg, Gesellschaft, Texte zur Militaersozilogie, Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus Verlag, 1983, p. 19. However the paradigm change after the end of the Cold War increased this trend to a new dimension.

⁴⁷⁷ Dandeker, p. 42.

concept, Christopher Dandeker describes the involvement of senior military personnel in the political decision making process:

“In managing the military and political interface of an operation whose political logic is dynamic and ongoing, the role of senior military personnel necessarily becomes more politicized. Given the complexity of the linkages between military, political, civil affairs, humanitarian, and other agencies ... the political and diplomatic skill requirements of military commanders have increased greatly.”⁴⁷⁸

Keeping the NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace process in mind, the final question is, which kind of civil-military relations concept is able to serve all these demands in the best way?

C. ASSESSMENT OF THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN APPROACHES

How does the American approach to civil-military relations serve the complex demands of contemporary social values, operational and combat effectiveness, modern business effectiveness, and media and public support?

- The American understanding of the military profession demands more sacrifice from their soldier than from the normal citizen. As compensation the military member gets a few privileges.
- A longer time of active duty of an all volunteer force, with education and the highest level of training, this ensures fighting capabilities.
- Modern bureaucracy technical developments are transferred to the military, outsourcing of all semi-military tasks to private companies and concentration on military core functions ensures monetary efficiency.
- The War against Iraq in April 2003 showed a new concept of ‘embedded reporters’, which was very successful. In addition, the appearance of military personnel in front of the camera after specific training was convincing.

⁴⁷⁸ Dandeker, pp. 41–42.

- A high level of patriotism in the civilian population⁴⁷⁹ ensures the military support from the beginning of military action, at least, as long as the main body of the population is convinced that it is going well.

How does the German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* serve the complex demands of contemporary social values, operational and combat effectiveness, modern business effectiveness, and media and public support?

- It balances the tensions between the civil society and military, because the soldier is a part of the society and public life.
- Conscription brings social developments directly into the military.
- The military ethos is not based on an overextended patriotic value, but on one's duty as a professional soldier that serves his country and guarantees human rights based on the Charter of the United Nations.
- The mission-oriented order gives the soldiers the necessary flexibility to achieve efficiency under given peace time conditions and in war time combat effectiveness.
- Market testing, outsourcing and incentive measures guarantee business effectiveness.
- Based on education and training and his perception as a civilian, the soldier is able to manage the balance of information between secrecy necessary in the military and the public demand for information.

How is the American system dealing with an increasing merger of the civilian and military spheres in the government?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act from 1986, with the main purpose to enhance joint war-fighting capabilities,⁴⁸⁰ additionally, shaped the civil-military relations at

⁴⁷⁹ In the United States this is a fragile attitude, as it is in every democracy more uncertain than in an authoritarian state. The example of the Vietnam War showed how support for a war can change during the time of a mission, if it is too long or seems to get unsuccessful.

⁴⁸⁰ Bill Nichols stated on September 11, 1986, that this bill fulfills the aims of President Eisenhower, who almost three decades ago said, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever. ... Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands..." Congress rejected President Eisenhower's appeals in the

the top level. It clearly described the civilian authority and shifted administrative power to civilian secretaries. Civilian authority was strengthened. The Secretary of Defense was empowered to lead and manage the Department of Defense effectively.⁴⁸¹ In addition, it strengthened the position of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as the primary military advisor to the highest civilians. It brought clear responsibilities in the chain of command directly from the President to the CINCs. The civil-military coordination and decision making instruments are advisory boards and individual advisors, and most important, the Armed Forces Policy Council.

How is the German concept dealing with an increasing merger of the civilian and military spheres in the government?

The German concept of *Innere Fuehrung* is able to provide an integrated approach: it prevents the isolation of separate civilian and military spheres, and it demands the presence of politically educated soldiers,⁴⁸² especially all of the staff-officers who have to pass an examination in policy at the command and General Staff College (*Fuehrungsakademie*) before they get promoted to the rank of a major. The military has to provide advice and guidance, institutionalized through the *Generalinspekteur*, before the politicians make the decisions about national security and defense issues.

Nations which recognize the global challenges, the changes of missions and international interdependencies, are moving towards changed capabilities, increased interoperability and multinational forces. In addition they have to modify and adapt their concepts of civil-military relations and military leadership concepts.

1950s. Today, 36 years later, we can now report: mission accomplished. Printed in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), The Goldwater-Nichols Act, ten years later, Autumn 96, p. 17.

⁴⁸¹ Locher, James R. III, in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), Autumn 96, p. 11. The management and administrative capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) were improved. The Secretary's of Defense span of control was reduced. Supervision of defense agencies were delegated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and field activities had to report directly to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ, p. 16.

⁴⁸² Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fue S I 4, ZDv 12/1 – Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr, Bonn, 1988.

The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* ensures the comprehensive integration of armed forces into a democratic state, and it helps to preserve internal stability.⁴⁸³ This is why it has become a model for the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Moreover, it could also be an example for a common foundation of civil-military relations in democratic states which build together multinational forces and have to synchronize their military leadership concepts to meet the main criteria for postmodern militaries.

The concept of the United States ensures that their Armed Forces can keep their values and morals, and holds military duty for the nation as the highest form of patriotism. The institutionalized decision making process secures the highest level of efficiency, even in a rapid changing technical and political environment. Constant planning, transformation and a decreased time of reaction will guarantee military supremacy in a new century.⁴⁸⁴ This requires the willingness of the nation to provide the military with resources, especially a large amount from the national budget. As long as the economy provides surplus, the need for social welfare can be kept small, and the civil-military relations are the best ever, since September 11th. The postmodern military age in the United States is in no danger to the United States Armed Forces.

⁴⁸³ Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper, 1994, p. 132.

⁴⁸⁴ Secretary of the Navy, NPS Guest lecture, May 16th, 2003.

VII. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The traditional American liberal ideas, based on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the United States, form the roots of America's attitude on liberty, freedom and citizenship.⁴⁸⁵ Jefferson's central idea was a system of general education, to give every citizen the information he needs to know his rights, interests and duties; to exercise with order and justice to become a good citizen.⁴⁸⁶ The German pluralistic society is based on a liberal-democratic basic idea in the free democratic constitutional structure. The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* reflects this liberal-democratic order. One of the basic elements is that every citizen should be educated⁴⁸⁷ to know and enjoy his rights of the Basic Law,⁴⁸⁸ especially when he has to defend them as a member of the German Federal Armed Forces.

My conclusion is that the basis of the American and German concepts of civil-military relations is similar. When comparing the Neo-Hamiltonian concept with the German approach to civil-military relations, similarities can be discovered, especially the integration of the military into the state and society. Despite this, the American and German civil-military relations are heavily influenced by the history of their constitutions⁴⁸⁹ and the result of the Second World War; but in different directions.

After the Second World War, the United States became a superpower with global national interests. Therefore, an Armed Force with strategic capabilities and sufficient troop strength became necessary. Major commitments in Korea,

⁴⁸⁵ Peterson, Merrill D., Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, The Library of America, New York, 1984, p. 19.

⁴⁸⁶ Peterson, pp. 459-460.

⁴⁸⁷ This kind of education over the liberal-democratic basic order and the Basic Law is done in the German Armed Forces during political education, called *Staatsbuergerlicher Unterricht*.

⁴⁸⁸ The German Constitution.

⁴⁸⁹ The failure of the Constitution in the Weimar Republic, with no real control over the military, and the consequences of the emergency laws determined the German concept of civil-military relations after the Second World War.

Vietnam and Iraq, and overseas assignments especially in South Korea and Germany kept the military busy and required a draft-selected system. A big change in the civil-military relations took place during and after the Vietnam War, with the change of the conscript system to an all-volunteer force. This was a reaction to the lessons learned during the Vietnam War with heavy losses of drafted young men that died for a war that didn't get full support from the American population, because the war was not seen as necessary for national survival. In addition to this emotional reason, the increasing high tech forces, especially Air Force and Navy, calls for experts and professionals who know what duties they have and what risks they must take as soldiers. Smaller Armed Forces with full professionals are producing very efficient security from the military point of view. However, they are in danger of losing contact with the American population if the recruitment policy is targeted to the lower classes and the National Reserve and National Guard shrink in their numbers.

The German system collapsed in the climax of the Second World War and until 1948, all ideas about rearmament were rejected. The most important first step was a reconciliation of the population with any form of German military. As explained in Chapter IV, the result was the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and its *Citizen in Uniform* model. It became essential to convince the population that the ability of survival depended on national responsibility and the capability to defend themselves. The education of the young conscripts was a precondition to achieve the understanding of democratic values and the necessity to defend the country. The aim of the German Federal Armed Forces was self-defense of their own border, with a mass army to protect the nation from the threat of the Warsaw Pact. The majority of the society in West Germany generally accepted this task and a balance of civil-military relations were achieved. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification in 1990, the main task of the Bundeswehr was still to defend the country against any threat from outside. In addition, since 1993, out-of-area missions and peace-keeping operations have been accepted step by step, as long as they are conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The Kosovo case in 1999, without a UN resolution, produced a heavily

controversial debate; however the German Armed Forces took part in the mission. As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, there was a shift in national interest and therefore in the national budget, to increases in social welfare benefits and the hope for a peace dividend; which could only be realized by a reduction in the military budget and strength of the *Bundeswehr*. This decrease took place over a few steps, beginning with over 500,000 soldiers in 1990, to 285,000 soldiers in 2003. The trend to a high tech military and more peace-keeping operations is calling for professional soldiers and questioning the conscript system, which has been reduced from 15 months to 9 months. Currently there are considerations to further reduction of the military time for drafted members to 6 months. From the political point of view, the conscript system with the possibility of conscientious objection is ensuring the integration of the *Bundeswehr* into state and society and is preventing the idea of an intervention force with a warrior's caste, which fights wars for political reasons and opportunities.

A. MILITARY INTEGRATION IN STATE AND SOCIETY

One development that the United States is facing now that the era of mass armies with mass civilian mobilization is over, is that the dividing line between the military and the organization of the society is becoming bigger. Smaller armed forces with extended training periods away from home and out-of-area operations do not allow soldiers to keep their ties to the civilian society.⁴⁹⁰ The most convincing argument that the U.S. Armed Forces and its soldiers are integrated in the society is that the professional soldier "is integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values."⁴⁹¹

However, this was not the case in Germany for the *Reichswehr*, with their 100,000 professional soldiers, which were called 'a state within a state'. Finally, high ranking officers of the *Reichswehr*, like Schleicher and von Papen, were deeply involved in politics, which led to the rise of Hitler as German Chancellor in

⁴⁹⁰ Janowitz, p. xiii.

⁴⁹¹ Janowitz, p. 440.

1933. This historical experience of a small professional army continues to be considered as a trauma in the German military mindset, and explains the resistance against a full professional army, even in the 21st century.

B. CHARACTER OF THE ARMED FORCES

Since 1991, with the out-of-area missions and peacekeeping operations, the *Bundeswehr* has incorporated a number of elements of the Janowitz constabulary concept. This concept is that “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeking viable international relations rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture.”⁴⁹² Considering this definition, the U.S. Armed Forces have been mainly constabulary forces since the 1970s. Likewise, since the end of the Cold War, the German Armed Forces have moved in a similar direction, with tasks being performed out of the country. The new German Defense Policy Guidelines (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*),⁴⁹³ published in May 2003, describes this shift for the first time, in a written political document approved by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. However the grand strategies of the United States and Germany are different. While the United States acts with global responsibility as the sole remaining superpower, Germany is embedded in multinational structures and acts in accordance with the United Nations or such other international organizations, as EU, NATO or OSCE.

⁴⁹² Janowitz, p. xiv.

⁴⁹³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Berlin, 21. May, 2003.

C. LEADERSHIP, AUTHORITY, DISCIPLINE, AND MORALE

Central issues in the military profession are leadership, authority, discipline, morale and military effectiveness. Janowitz describes a shift in authority, beginning in 1940 and lasting over three decades, from a formal military system to a “mixture of official regulations, scientific experience, and mutual trust, plus a strong component of personal authority.”⁴⁹⁴ Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier*, offers the hypothesis:

There had been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritative domination to greater reliance on explanation, expertise, and group consensus. Although there is powerful ideological and institutional resistance to change in the military⁴⁹⁵, this trend has continued during the past decade.⁴⁹⁶

Although in civilian occupations, money is often enough to motivate good performance, this is not true in the military profession. Soldiers can be motivated by money, but when it comes to the most dangerous task, to risk the life, more than money is necessary, even in democratic Armed Forces. Moreover, a kind of heroic tradition, professional identification, and honor bind the men to the task and order.⁴⁹⁷ In addition, under the aspect to risk the own life and the life of the comrades, the most important criteria of military profession are, the individual leadership qualities, self-discipline, and a high level of morale. However, in order to recruit the best men for the service, the military salary must be competitive with the civilian payment. This must be evaluated in correlation with the overall economic situation. This pattern can be seen in all western countries with their materialistic values.

⁴⁹⁴ Janowitz, p. xvii.

⁴⁹⁵ A sizeable number of officers are convinced that the shift in regulations has been excessive and represents undue civilization. Janowitz, p. xvii.

⁴⁹⁶ Janowitz, p. xvii.

⁴⁹⁷ Janowitz, p. 422.

D. POLITICAL ACTIVITY, EDUCATION, AND CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

The attitude that differ the most between the American and German civil-military relations is the approach to political activity during the time of active duty. In the United States it is the citizens' duty to vote, but to become elected, a soldier must first leave the Armed Forces and become a reservist. In Germany, to run for a political public office is encouraged, even during the time of active duty. Nevertheless, political education is required for the officer corps in the United States and in Germany. As Jannowitz describes:

It is impossible to isolate the professional soldier from domestic political life and it is undesirable to leave the task of political education completely to the professionals themselves, even though they have been highly responsible in this assignment. The goal of political education is to develop a commitment to the democratic system and an understanding of how it works. Even though this task must rest within the profession itself, it is possible to conceive of a bipartisan contribution by the political parties.⁴⁹⁸

In conclusion, although both systems call for political education, they have different applications.⁴⁹⁹ In the United States it is an education intended to promote the growth of a good patriotic citizen and to provide current political issues, mostly from the domestic perspective. In Germany, the field manual ZDv 12/1 Political Education in the Bundeswehr regulates political education. It is mainly basic information about the free democratic constitutional structure, international organizations and it provides additional information about current global political developments

⁴⁹⁸ Janowitz, p. 439.

⁴⁹⁹ Political education is one of the main pillars of the *Innere Fuehrung* concept. Instructions are given in the field manual ZDv 12/1 from April 2001. The main effort is in the education of the citizen in uniform, that he know' and understand his rights, and to keep him informed about current events. The political education in the U.S. Armed Forces has in general the same intention; however the regulation is not so limited as in the German field manual and the emphasis on patriotism seems to be more significant to sustain the moral, rather than providing just impartial information.

Finally, it should be considered that civilian supremacy in politics could be supported by well-balanced, mutual respected civil-military relations in a healthy political culture, based on a democratic constitution, like it is in both the United States and in Germany. However, in every democratic country, civilian supremacy must prevail over different destroying forces in the daily struggle. Louis Smith has written:

Civil dominance, regardless of how securely grounded it may be in the Constitution and in the statutes, is not self-implementing. Like any other principle, it must be cherished in the public mind if it is to prevail. Like any other policy, it requires translation into effective administration.⁵⁰⁰

⁵⁰⁰ Smith, Louis B., American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 11 and Trask, p. 29

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